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The legal maxim Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is not a phrase
in constant use among attorneys whose practice is concerned with fed-
eral regulatory agencies. The forms of conduct with which federal reg-
ulatory statutes are concerned are much more amenable to flat "thou
shalt nots" than to prohibitions hinging upon a state of mind. Hori-
zontal mergers, for example, may or may not violate the anti-trust laws,
but their illegality is not dependent upon the motives of their pro-
moters. The absence of any necessity for proof of motive in such pro-
hibitions is probably fortunate for all concerned. Introducing such an
element-whether it be called motive, intent, scienter, malice, or that
old, odd complex, mens rea-into either a criminal or civil offense
places an onerous burden on the adjudicatory system-examination of
the mind of the actor as well as the more easily ascertainable effects of
his actions.
It is, therefore, both curious and significant that motive and intent
(if not, indeed, a form of mens rea) have, over the past two decades, as-
sumed a growing and increasingly troublesome role in the adjudication
of cases arising under one of the most important of the federal regula-
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tory statutes, the National Labor Relations Act.1 It has long been recog-
nized that many actions will be held to constitute unfair labor practices
per se, whatever the state of mind which accompanies them. Represen-
tatives of labor and management are also aware, however, that the
legality of certain types of conduct may be dependent upon an analysis
of motive. The subject matter of the cases which have turned upon such
an analysis-terminations of employment, fringe benefits, hiring halls,
lockouts, union security, plant closures-underlines the grave impor-
tance of the motive question to both management and labor. The same
decisions also disclose the existence of a wide divergence of views among
the members of the Court as to the proper role of motive in unfair
labor practice cases, a divergence which has not only led to confusion
as to the proper tests of the legality of a wide range of employer and
union conduct but which also touches upon the most fundamental prob-
lems of policy in the administration of our federal labor laws.
Not long ago, in reviewing the labor law product of a recent term of
the Court, Professor Clyde Summers caustically accused the Court of
"driving into the darkness of lightless language the actual grounds for
its decision." 2 It is significant that the specific cases which drew this
rebuke from such a respected observer were controversies which in-
timately involved problems of motive and proof of motive. It is the
thesis of this article that over the years the proper role of motive in de-
termining what constitutes an unfair labor practice has been warped
from the original statutory design; furthermore, that both motive and
the requisite proof of motive are factors which, in current usage, often
disguise rather than clarify the thrust of the prohibitions contained in
the Act and unnecessarily hamper its proper administration. Finally, it
is the conclusion of this study that the Court must reassess both motive
and its necessary evidentiary support in terms which will better dis.
close what Professor Summers terms the "actual grounds" of decision.
I. The Problem and Its Source
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act3 sets forth, inter alia,
those categories of employer and union conduct which constitute pro-
hibited unfair labor practices. Prohibitions relating to employer con-
duct are contained in subsection (a), those pertaining to union acts are
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964).
2. Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YAu= L.J. 59, 73-74
(1965).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
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listed in subsection (b), and special rules applicable to both labor and
management are set forth in subsections (d) and (e). As to a number of
these provisions, motive or intent4 has been clearly and consistently re-
garded as irrelevant. An employer who recognizes or bargains collec-
tively with one of two competing unions,5 or who honestly but mis-
takenly punishes an employee for alleged misconduct relating to
protected concerted activities,0 is guilty of violating the statute no
matter what his motivation.7 Similarly a union which compels an em-
ployer to designate, against his will, an employer association as his
representative in collective bargaining will be held to violate the statute
whatever the reasons impelling the demand.8 The focus of this study,
however, is upon that group of unfair labor practices in which the
intent of the actor has been found to be a critical factor in determining
the legality of employer or union conduct." Within this category, the
treatment of motive has been particularly significant-and particularly
4. While "motive" and "intent" are, under some circumstances, distinguishable terms,
they have been used as though they were synonymous by both the National Labor Rela.
dons Board and the courts in the case law under study. Accordingly, this analysis doe
not attempt to distinguish between the two and will use them interdangeably.
5. Midwest Piping 8: Supply Co., 63 N.LR.B. 1060 (1945). As subsequently revised and
stated in Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.LR.B. 1027 (1958), the Midwest Piping rule holds that
"upon presentation of a rival or conflicting claim which raises a real question concerning
representation, an employer may not go so far as to bargain collectively with the incum-
bent (or any other) union unless and until the question concerning representation has
been settled by the Board." Id. at 1029.
6. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 US. 21, 23 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963). enforcement denied, 339 F.2d
533 (3d Cir. 1964) (fear of economic reprisal); Swift & Co., 128 N.L.1.B. 732 (1960), enforce-
ment denied, 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961) (honest mistake); Novak Logging Co., 119
N.LR.B. 1573 (1958) (favoritism). In B.M. Reeves Co., 128 N.LR.B. 320 (1960), the Board
specifically noted that:
[T]he element of intent or motive . .. is immaterial. The employer's conduct is
illegal only if the recognition and contract were accorded a minority union or ac-
corded the union at a time when a real question concerning representation existed.
Id. at 322. See also NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22 (1964).
8. Metropolitan Dist. Council (McCloskey & Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1583 (195).
9. Perhaps the most prominent of such situations, other than those discussed herein,
is in the area of certain Section 8(a)(5) violations bearing upon the issue of good faith.
That section requires an employer to recognize a union (even without certification after
a Board-conducted secret ballot among the involved employees) if he has no good-faith
doubt as to its majority support in an appropriate unit. Determination of that central
issue of good-faith doubt necessarily involves the Board in an examination of employer
motivation. See, e.g., Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 508 F.2d 637 (9th
Cir. 1962).
There are other areas of Section 8 where the role of motive as a necessary element of
an unfair labor practice must rest upon the breadth of definition of that term. Section
8(b)(4), for example, condemns both strikes and union coercion if the union's conduct has
as "an object" one of the forbidden aims listed in the four subparagraphs of the section.
Determination of whether a strike is called or conducted to achieve, at least in part, one
of these "objects" might be considered in some degree equivalent to an examination of
motive. See, for example, Glazier's Local 513 (Cupples Products Corporation), 148 N.L.R.B.
1648 (1964), where the Board was required to find whether picketing was for organizational
purposes or to induce a work stoppage in order to force an employer to stop using non-
union products.
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subject to judicial disagreement and modification-in cases involving
the complementary restrictions of Sections 8(a)(8) and 8(b)(2). This
analysis, accordingly, will concentrate on these sections, with some
reference to, and comparison with, the provisions of Section 8(a)(1).
The basic thrust of Section 8(a)(3)10 is stated almost too concisely in
its opening phrase: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." The section thus postulates
three elements of a basic violation. The action must constitute "dis-
crimination," it must take effect in the particular area of "hire, tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment" and it must
be "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
This basic prohibition is followed by complex provisos creating a
limited exemption as to certain union security contract clauses. Section
8(b)(2), 11 in turn, forbids a union "to cause or attempt to cause" an
employer to violate Section 8(a)(3) or to discriminate against an em-
ployee whose non-membership results from any factor other than failure
to pay dues and initiation fees. The essential aim of these sections is
clear:
The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their
organizational rights. Thus §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed
to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be
good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any
union without imperiling their livelihood. 12
Though the purpose is clear and the statutory language is brief, few
provisions of the Act have so troubled the Board and the courts in
their application.
The problem of motive arises under Sections 8(a)(8) and 8(b)(2)
because it is only discrimination "to encourage or discourage" union
membership that is forbidden. The phrase "to encourage or discour-
age" can, of course, be read to require only that an effect of encourage-
ment or deterrence of membership be shown to result from the dis-
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents .. to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection (a)(3) ...or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees unfomly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....
12. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
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crimination. But other readings are equally plausible. Briefly, the
statutory language may be interpreted as requiring (a) an effect of en-
couragement or discouragement; (b) an intention to achieve that effect;
(c) both effect and intent; or (d) either effect or intent.23 Analysis of
these alternatives and their various implications is not a futile scholastic
exercise. Such a study is essential because the consequences of selecting
any one of these alternatives in a given case are significant but not im-
mediately apparent.14
Such consequences are not, moreover, restricted to a few unique
situations; they extend to a wide variety of both management and union
actions. And the substantial range of conduct affected frequently
touches upon the most intimate aspects of the power balance between
unions and employers in our society. In the past three decades, the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts have demonstrated an
increasing awareness of the political and economic consequences of a
choice between the competing interpretations. The most recent attempt
of the Supreme Court to resolve the problems involved" is but an-
other strand in a web of long devising, a web which has become so en-
tangled over the years as to make a retracing of its origins and construc-
tion essential.
II. The Tangled Web
A. Stage One-Motive as Evidence of Discrimination
Five months after the National Labor Relations Act became law, the
new National Labor Relations Board issued its first decision, a decision
which, appropriately enough, touched upon motivation in discrimina-
tion cases. In Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.16 the Board was re-
13. In each case, of course, there is the further problem of the quantum of evidencc
necessary to sustain the finding.
14. This can be illustrated by a not-uncommon example. An employer's production
and maintenance employees are represented by a union with which it has an amicable
relationship. The employer desires, for reasons possibly having nothing to do with the
presence of the union, to institute a pension plan with substantial benefits for its unrep-
resented clerical and administrative staff, a plan which is not in effect or offered for the
unionized group. Institution of the plan, under these circumstances, can easily be alleged
to be discriminatory: non-union employees receive different and more favorable treatment
than union personnel The discrimination takes place in the area of terms and conditions
of employment. Affirmative evidence of a motive to discourage would, however, be lack-
ing. On the other hand, it could easily be alleged that an effect of discouragement was
either explicit or implicit in the disparate treatment. Accordingly, whether or not insti-
tution of the plan would result in a violation of Section 8(a)(3) must necessarily depend
upon-and vary with-the selection of the alternative requirements set forth in the text.
15. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailers,
389 U.S. 375 (1967).
16. 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), enforcement denied in tart, 91 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1937), reu'd,
303 U.S. 261 (1938).
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quired to determine whether the discharge of a number of employees
had been the result of their union membership and activity. In the
course of its decision, the Board commented as follows:
Here, as generally, in discharging these employees the respondents
did not openly state that they were being discharged for union
membership or activity, so that standing by themselves the actual
discharges constitute equivocal acts in the light of the conflicting
reasons that are advanced. In reaching a decision between these
conflicting contentions, the Board has had to take into considera-
tion the entire background of the discharges, the inferences to be
drawn from testimony and conduct, and the soundness of the con-
tentions when tested against such background and inferences....
[A]s the Supreme Court has stated "Motive is a persuasive inter-
preter of equivocal conduct."'17
Having previously found evidence of a pervasive hostility on the part
of the employer with respect to the union, the Board concluded that a
substantial number of the discharges had been in violation of the Act.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, apart from its historical significance,
deserves special attention because it aptly displays the role accorded to
the employer's state of mind in early discrimination cases. While an oc-
casional employer was so badly advised as to state to his departing
victim, "Jack, if you want to know why you are fired, the reason is the
Union,""' such rough honesty was not the rule.10 In the normal case,
where direct evidence was lacking that protected activity had caused the
economic punishment, the Board turned to an examination of the em-
ployer's mental processes. Proof of an overall anti-union animus was, in
many instances, considered sufficient to demonstrate that the reason
(i.e., "motive") for a termination or demotion was union activity rather
than some other, independent cause for discipline.
In Pennsylvania Greyhound neither an intention to discourage union
membership nor the actual existence of such an effect was the subject
of direct Board inquiry or explicit finding. Instead, the Board used the
somewhat simplistic equation that punishment because of union activ-
ity must equal discrimination to discourage union membership. It was
not the employer's ultimate intent, as such, that was the focus of in-
quiry; rather, motive played the limited :role of a "persuasive inter-
17. 1 N.L.R.B. at 23.
18. Club Troika, Inc.j 2 N.LR.B. 90, 93 (1936).
19. As the Board noted in its Second Annual Report, "In no case has d respondent
admitted in its pleadings or at the hearing that it has discriminated against employeces
because of their union activity. Frequently, however, clear evidence of discriminatlon has
gone uncontradicted." 2 NLRB ANN. Rap. 70 n.9 (1937).
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preter of equivocal conduct." It was treated not as an essential element
of the substantive violation, but as an evidentiary aid in determining
whether protected union activity had in fact been the cause of the
terminations.
Of course, where discipline dearly constituted retribution for union
activity, the Board could reasonably have concluded that the employer
had consciously or unconsciously intended to discourage union mem-
bership and that such discouragement had in fact resulted. Both intent
and effect, as possible statutory requirements, accordingly would have
been established. But (and the caveat is of consequence) the early
Board approach did not consider whether these were essential elements
of an unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court's early approach paralleled that of the Board. In
sustaining the constitutionality of the Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,20 the Court had occasion to discuss briefly the role of
motivation in discharge cases.
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The
employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce
its employees with respect to their self-organization and representa-
tion, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its
authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge
when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimida-
tion and coercion. The true purpose is the subject of investigation
with full opportunity to show the facts.2'-
While this statement has since been cited as establishing a requirement
that the Board must find a motive to discourage or encourage union
membership in Section 8(a)(3) cases, it is dear from the context that
the Court did not mean to advance any such proposition. The Court
was dealing with problems of proof, not enunciating the legal elements
of an unfair labor practice. A discharge resulting from union activity
is discriminatory and hence illegal; one based upon cause is not. Where
the circumstances are equivocal, inquiry must be made as to the prob-
able causation.
20. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
21. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added). In a companion case decided on ie same date,
Associated Press v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 103 (1937), the Court again found a violation to have
been established because the "actual reason" for a discharge was the union aotivit' of
the terminated employee. In doing so, the Court commented that, while the statute "does
not preclude a discharge on the ostensible grounds for the petitioner's action, it forbids
discharge for what has been found to be the real mnotive of the petitioner." Id. at 132
(emphasis added).
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Thus in their early applications of Section 8(a)(3), 22 both the Board
and the Supreme Court regarded motive as an evidentiary tool rather
than a statutory requirement. In the first cases to come before it, the
Board contented itself with asking "Did you or did you not discharge
this employee because he engaged in union activity?" It did not ask the
further question "And when you did so, did you intend to discourage
union membership?" By not recognizing any need for an explicit find.
ing as to intent, the Board at least left open (if indeed it did not negate)
the element of intent to discourage as a requisite of the violation.
It is true that on occasion the language of a particular Board de-
cision referred in a discrimination case to the existence of an intention
to discourage union membership. None of these references, however,
appeared to treat motive as an essential element of the violation. 8
Instead, when the Board did pay special attention to the element of dis-
couragement in this early period, it was frequently noting the existence
of the effect rather than demonstrating any visible interest as to whether
that particular result had been intended.2 4
The same concentration upon impact rather than motivation became
even more apparent as cases were presented to the Board in which the
existence of an affirmative intent to encourage or discourage member-
ship was actively rebutted. Thus in NLRB v. Star Publishing Co." the
Ninth Circuit, affirming a Board order reinstating transferred em-
ployees in their former positions, held that the Act "prohibits unfair
22. While Section 8(a)(3) was, during the period from 1935 to 1947, designated as
Section 8(3), present designation has been used throughout this study to avoid unnecessary
confusion.
23. An illustrative case is Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1, enforcement denied in 'Part,
87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936), where the Board found that certain employees were "discharged
and discriminated against in regard to hire and tenure of employment for the purpose of
discouraging membership in the Union." Id. at 13 (emphasis added). The Board went on,
however, to make it clear that it was merely determining whether "cause" or union activity
had impelled the discharge rather than mounting a separate investigation into whether
there was a desire to discourage membership. Id. See also Quidnick Dye Works, Inc., 2
N.L.R.B. 963 (1937), where the brother of a union adherent was discharged along with
his activist sibling. Under the circumstances, the Board could not treat the termination as
caused by the dischargee's own union activity, but found that it was "calculated to and
did have the necessary effect of discouraging membership in the Union." Id. at 968, The
same case was subsequently described by the Board as standing for the proposition that
"all that is necessary is that . . . [the] discharge have a necessary effect of discouraging
membership in the union." 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 74 (1937).
24. See, e.g., Highway Trailer Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 591 (1937), enforced, 95 F.2d 1012
(7th Cir. 1938). There a collective bargaining contract allowed a union to obtain the dis.
charge of any employee found by it to be "undesirable." Without separate inquiry into
the intent of the parties, the Board concluded that "[b]y establishing as a condition of
employment the liability to discharge at the whim of the shop committee . . . the
respondent has discriminated in favor of the [union] and its members. Such discrimination
encourages membership in the [union], and by virtue of the arbitrary power vested in the
[union), discourages membership in any other labor organization." Id. at 610.
25. 97 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938).
1276
Unfair Labor Practices
labor practices without regard to the factors causing them," and ob-
served that there is no immunity "because the employer may think that
the exigencies of the moment" require a specific action.20 The Board
later summarized this holding by stating that "the law is well settled
that 'when it is once made to appear from the primary facts that the
employer has violated the express provisions of the Act, we may not
inquire into his motives,' even where it is showm that the employer
'has not wilfully violated' the Act."27
Further evidence that the Board and the courts were reading the Act
as not requiring a specific showing of intent to discourage or encourage
membership is provided by the Board's treatment of discharges result-
ing from the breach of invalid company rules. In these cases, although
the rules were not shown to have been promulgated as anti-union
measures, they were nonetheless found to interfere with the exercise of
Section 7 rights. Penalties inflicted upon employees for their breach
were, in the Board's view, necessarily violations of Section 8(a)(3) des-
pite the absence of any evidence that the intent behind either the in-
stitution or the enforcement of them had been to discourage union
membership. Such intent was irrelevant if the rule in question other-
wise violated the Act. As the Board stated in Republic Aviation Corp.,2
a case involving company rules prohibiting solicitation and distri-
bution of literature on company property, "it is now established that,
in the absence of special circumstances, a rule prohibiting union
activity on company property outside of working time constitutes an
unreasonable impediment to self-organization, and that discharges for
violation thereof are discriminatory."29- The Supreme Court, in aflirnm-
ing the Board's order, was equally convinced that proof of motivation
was irrelevant:
[P]etitioner urges that irrespective of the validity of the rule
against solicitation, its application in this instance did not violate
§ 8(3) because the rule was not discriminatorily applied against
union solicitation but was impartially enforced against all solici-
tors. It seems clear, however, that if a rule against solicitation is
invalid as to union solicitation on the employer's premises during
the employee's own time, a discharge because of violation of that
26. Id. at 470.
27. Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 878, 879 (1946). The Board cited NLRB v.
Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1942). and NLRB v. Gluck Brewing Co., 144
F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944).
28. 51 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1944), afJ'd, 324 U.S. 793(1945).
29. Id. at 1187. See also LeTourneau Co., 54 N.I..RB. 1253, enforcement denied, 143
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944), reu'd, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)
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rule discriminates within the meaning of § 8(3) in that it dis.
courages membership in a labor organization.S0
Although such terms as "motive," "purpose," "intent," and "effect"
were scattered with some largess throughout the texts of the early deci-
sions,3' the usage was usually casual and without any observable attempt
to define the statutory requirements of the violation. Nevertheless, cer-
tain conclusions can be drawn from the general pattern of the decisions
of this era. Once it had established the existence of punishment based
upon union activity, the Board did not, at this stage, require a separate
finding of an intent or an effect of discouragement or encouragement of
union membership. In those instances where such an impact clearly
attached to an employer's action, not only was the absence of a motive
to discourage found irrelevant, as in Republic Aviation, but affirmative
evidence of independent economic motivation, as in Star Publishing,
was found not to bar an unfair labor practice finding.82
30. Republic Aviation Corp. T. NLRB, 324 US. 793, 805 (1945).31. The Board's carelessness as to precision of language is illustrated, to choote oneexample from many, by its decisions in May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.1. 976 (1944),enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946) and Carl L. Norden,Inc., 62 N.LR.B. 828 (1945). Both cases involved discharges for what l1e employers claimedwere breaches of valid no-solicitation rules. Operating on the premise that discriminatoryapplication of such a rule (i.e, applying it only to union solicitation) would make enforc.ment of even a valid rule unlawful, the Board found that the employers in both cases hadviolated the Act in this manner. In May Dep't Stores, the Board additionally observcd
that[t]he failure to conduct a fair investigation coupled with the respondent's generalantipathy to the Union, dearly evidenced the respondent's eagerness to rid itself ofunion adherents and strongly suggests that the real motive underlying the dischargeand lay-offs was the respondent's anti-union animus, rather than any sincere beliefon its part that the employees in question had violated the rule....59 N.L.R.B. at 982. Similarly, in the Norden case, the Board observed that the "truemotive" for the discharge was "a desire to interfere with, discourage, and restrain ...union activities." 62 N.L.R.B. at 831. Motive in the sense of anti-union animus and adesire to interfere with union activity was thus adverted to in the same manner as in thecases described above when the actual cause for punishment was the central Issue. Thereferences dearly do not purport to make a finding of intent a requisite for any discrhnl
nation violation. These same decisions, however, were subsequently described In theBoard's Tenth Annual Report as standing for the proposition thatwhere the evidence establishes that an employer's true motive in discharging anemployee is to discourage membership in a labor organization, the Board has refusedto permit the employer to effectuate his unlawful motive under the guise of . . .[lawful] rules and regulations.
10 NLRB ANN. RE'. 42 (1945).32. The Board treatment of Section 8(a)(3) cases drew early critical comment. ChesterWard, in a 1939 study, stressed the problems which could arise if the Board continued toread the statutory term in Section 8(a)(3) of "union membership" as though it were equiva.lent to the phrase "union activities."if. it is possibe to "discim inate bcause of union activities" without "encouraging ordiscouragig membershp i a laor organization, it would seem to be the duty ofthe Board in each case of an allegation of violation of Section 8(3) to look forstantial" evidence that the employer's conduct had the effect of such encouragementor discouragemnent.. And the possibility of "discrimination" without "discouragement"'s potential in botha the type of union activities concerned and in the manner i t oh
the discrimination is effected.
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B. Stage Two--Motive as an Essential Finding
In 1947 Congress drastically revised the basic thrust of the National
Labor Relations Act through enactment of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act.33 Section 8(a)(3) was substantially modified with respect to
the provisos exempting union security contracts, but the introductory
language containing the overall prohibition was left unchanged. Two
other new provisions, however, adverted to the discrimination theme
of the section. Section 8(b)(2)3 set forth a new unfair labor practice
forbidding unions to cause or attempt to cause an employer to violate
Section 8(a)(3). Section 10(c), 35 relating to the procedures and restric-
tions applicable to unfair labor practice proceedings, was amended to
include the direction that "[n]o order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended
or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual
was suspended or discharged for cause."
Neither of the new provisions required any appreciable change in the
established treatment of motive in unfair labor practice cases. Motive
was, in fact, scarcely mentioned in connection with Section 8(b)(2). The
new restrictions of that section were dearly a response to legislative
concern that union power was being utilized to punish employees by
means of contracts containing union security clauses. 0 But neither the
reports and debates nor the text of Section 8(b)(2) disclosed any indica-
tion of a legislative decision as to what part, if any, a motive to en-
courage or discourage union membership was to play under either
Section 8(a)(3) or the new section.37
Ward, "Discrimination" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1152, 1158(1939).
Moving from the issue of effect to that of intent, he had a further warning
The strictest interpretation of Section 8(3) would, of course, require not only proof
that membership in a union was in fact encouraged or discouraged, but aho a specific
intent to bring about that result. Such an intent could not be shown by substantial
evidence in the union activities-employer discipline cases considered above.
Id. at 1166 (emphasis added). The problems thus suggested were more latent than real at
the time of Ward's analysis. Fifteen years later they could no longer be ignored and, in
Radio Officers' Union v. NLR.B, 347 U.S. 17, 43 n.47 (1954), the Supreme Court accorded
his perception a footnote nod of recognition.
33. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
36. The Senate Report on the proposed new Section 8(b)(2) noted that it was "designed
to protect individual employees from discrimination in employment induced by a labor
organization which has a union-shop contract with an employer.. :* S. REP. No. 105 on
S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947). in 1 NLRB, Lrmtss.xrzvE Hsrorty or Tm L"on
MANAGEmENT REL -ioNs Aer 427 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Lrc. Hisr. LMRA]. Refer-
ences to the section in the debates centered upon instances in which employees in disfavor
with their union were subsequently punished by loss of employment through enforcement
of closed shop and union shop contracts. In this regard, see comments by Senators Taft and
Ball, 2 I G. Hisr. LMfRA 1010, 1094, 1199-1200, 1420.
37. This is, of course, apart from the references to motive in the pretext cases where,
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Motive, on the other hand, was the subject of considerable discus-
sion with respect to the amendment of Section 10(c). The congressional
concern with motivation, however, was limited to the Board's use of
"motive" in the sense of anti-union animus on the part of an employer,
in deciding whether or not a given disciplinary measure had in fact
resulted from participation in protected concerted activity. Further-
more, in spite of congressional attempts to curb the Board's authority to
rely on motive in making such determinations, the amendment which
was finally enacted had no such effect. 8 As Senator Taft summarized
the effect of the Section 10(a) amendment on cause:
as discussed in note 38 infra, the issue before the Board is whether an individual has
been punished because of some other, unrelated cause.
38. The Board was heavily criticized for its decisions in cases where it found utnion
activity to be the operative reason for discipline notwithstanding the employer's allegation
that employee misconduct or other "cause" had impelled that discipline. The Hartley bill
in the House of Representatives attempted to curb the Board in such instances by
requiring that no reinstatement or back pay could be ordered "unless tile weight of the
evidence" showed that the suspension or discharge was not for cause. H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in 1 LEG. Hssr. LMRA 69. The House Report, in this regard,
charged that "[in the past, the Board, admitting that an employee was guilty of gross
misconduct, nevertheless frequently reinstated him, 'inferring' that, because he was a
member or an official of a union, this, not his misconduct, was the reason for his dis.
charge." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in 1 LEG. HIsT. LMRA 333. Under
its proposed change, the Report continued, the Board would not be able to "'infer' al
improper reason when the evidence show~ed] cause for discipline or discharge." Id. 334.
In the final text of the legislation, however, the requirement as to the "weight of the
evidence" was deleted and Senator Taft described the change in Section 10(c) as not
altering "the present rule and the present practice of the Board." 2 LEG. Hisr. LMRA 1595.
At a prior point in the colloquy which gave rise to this statement, Senator Taft presented
a justification for inclusion of an amendment which would not alter the Board's approach:
When we have a conference with the House and the House yields on all the major
points, if the House conferees want certain language in, and the language does not
do any more than state the existing law, it is a little hard to refuse to put it in,
That is why we put it in. For the purpose of the REconD, I am glad to make that
statement, because there is no intention whatever to change the existing law on this
particular question.
Id. at 1594. The House Conference Report, H.R. CONF. REP'. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947), in 1 Leg. Hist. 559, noted that "[the Conference agreement omits the 'weight of
evidence' language, since the Board, under the general provisions of section 10, must act
on a preponderance of evidence .... " Professor Archibald Cox, in a subsequent analysis
of the 1947 amendments, concluded that the basic thrust of Section 8(a)(3) had not been
altered by the addition of the "cause" language of Section 10(c). Professor Cox, it is true,
referred to motive, in this respect, as a key element of Section 8(a)(3) violations:
The reason the employer's motive is decisive is plain. Imposed legal duties are usually
a compromise between conflicting interests, the aggressor being privileged to invade
the victim's interest to protect his own, so far as the law recognizes it. Hence, when
the aggressor is not actuated by a desire to protect a recognized interest, tire basis for
his excuse disappears. This philosophy is embedded in Section 8(3). If an employer
discharges an employee to protect his interest in building up an efficient working
force, he does not commit an unfair labor practice, even though the discharged
employee is a union leader and organization is thereby set back. On the other hand,
if the employer's action springs from a desire to discourage organization, the privilege
is lost and the discharge is unlawful.
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1,
20-21 (1947). While these comments were subsequently cited by the Court in Radio Officers'
Union, 347 U.S. 17, 43 n.47 (1954), as support for the proposition that an intent to dis.
courage or encourage membership is essential to the violation in all instances, it is clear
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The Board will have to determine-and it always has-whether
the discharge was for cause or for union activity, and the pre-
ponderance of the evidence will determine that question50
The Board's decisions under the amended statute accordingly con-
tinued to utilize motive as a guide when the evidence was otherwise
ambiguous as to whether an economic penalty had been inflicted in re-
prisal for union activity. Even here, however, the Board was not always
consistent. Thus in Shell Oil Co., 0 it found no violation in a refusal
to extend a wage increase to unionized employees during negotia-
tions for a new contract, since the record failed to demonstrate any anti-
union motivation for the refusal. 41
By way of contrast, in General Electric Co., the employer at the
conclusion of an economic strike classified its employees into two groups
on the basis of their willingness to work during the stoppage. The
strikers, unlike the nonstrikers, were denied "continuous service credit"
for the period of the strike with resultant impact upon vacation and
retirement benefits and upon seniority standing. The Board, without
mentioning motive, found that denial of the credit for vacations and
retirement was not "discriminatory" as merely reflecting normal loss
of remuneration while on strike. As to seniority, however, the Board
found a violation because " the effect of the Respondent's action with
respect to seniority was to penalize the strikers because of their con-
certed activities."43 Whatever the merits of this distinction, it is plain
that it was the effect of the employer action in General Electric rather
than its motivation which was found controlling."4
from the context of the Cox analysis that it was concerned only with the situations pre-
viously discussed where the cause of a particular act of discipline was placed in dispute.
39. 2 LEG. Hisr. LMRA 1595. Much the same conclusion was reached by the Supreme
Court a number of years later in interpreting the thrust of the 1947 amendments:
The legislative history of that provision [the limitation in Section 10(c) as to re-
instatement of individuals discharged for cause] indicates that it as designed to
preclude the Board from reinstating an individual who has been discharged because
of misconduct. There is no indication, however, that it was designed to curtail the
Board's power in fashioning remedies when the loss of employment stems directly
from an unfair labor practice as in the case at hand.
Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964).
40. 77 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1948).
41. In the language of the Board itself:
As the record otherwise fails to establish that the wage increases were ithheld for
anti-union considerations, the Trial Examiner's finding of discrimination is without
support and is hereby reversed. Absent an unlawful motive, an employer is privileged
to give wage increases to his unorganized employees, at a time when his other em-
ployees are seeking to bargain collectively through a statutory representative.
Id. at 1310.
42. 80 NL.R.B. 510 (1948).
43. Id. at 513.
44. The same conclusion was reached in other types of discrimination cases. Thus in
Atlantic Towing Company, 75 N.L.R.B. 1169 (1948), enforcement denied, 180 F.2d 726
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In its 1950 Annual Report, however, the Board not only ignored the
possibility that its approach to Section 8(a)(3) was dichotomous as to
the factor of intent but strongly suggested that "an illegal motive" Was
essential to a violation of that provision:
The Board recognizes that the act does not circumscribe the right
of an employer to select, discharge, or discipline his employees, or
to otherwise alter their employment status, for reasons other than
those forbidden by the act. In each case, therefore, the Board scru-
tinizes the facts to determine whether or not the treatment of the
employee involved was motivated by a desire on the part of an em-
ployer to encourage or discourage union membership or other
activities protected by the statute. For the Board to find a violation
of this section, a preponderance of the evidence must show that the
employer acted from an illegal motive. A "strong presumption" is
not enough. 45
Taken literally, this statement is obviously incorrect. The cases dis-
cussed in the preceding sections of this study amply demonstrate that
the Board did not, up to this point, "in each case" assess whether or not
an illegal motive was present.4 6
In its next Annual Report, indeed, the Board retreated from its un-
tenable position. Its restatement admitted the existence of "non-
(5th Cir. 1950) the discharge of an employee who made false statements about the com-
pany's attitude toward unions was held unlawful. The discharge was, so far as the Board's
decision shows, solely motivated by the employer's conclusion that he did not Want a
"liar" working for him. The Board found, however, that under all the circumstances the
erroneous statements by the dischargee were a part of protected concerted activity astd
that his termination was "discriminatory as tending to discourage membership in the
Union." Id. at 1173.
45. 15 NLRB ANN. RFt. 104 (1950) (emphasis added).
46. The decisions cited in the Report to support the quoted passage were Puntch & Judy
Togs, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 499 (1949): Louisville Title Agency, 85 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1949); Stra-
chan Shipping Co,, 87 N.L.R.B. 431 (1949); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1142 (1950);
and W.C. Nabors Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 538 (1950), enforced, 196 F.2d 272 (5th Cir), cert.
denied, 844 U.S. 865 (1952). An examination of their individual holdings, however, Is
instructive. Each of these cases involved a discharge or transfer in which the employer's
defense-that the action was taken for a reason other than the employee's union activity-
was accepted by the Board. Strachan Shipping is worth further mention. In that case,
the discharge was allegedly impelled by union pressure on the employer. A contention that
Section 8(a)(3) had been violated was dismissed without discussion and the case was
handled as a Section 8(a)(1) matter. It is possible, although one can only speculate, that
the fact that the alleged discriminatee was a union member was, at this point, viewed by
the Board as militating against any finding that his membership was or could be "ef-
couraged or discouraged."
In short, motive was alluded to in these decisions in the same context in which It had
been raised in the Board's initial decision in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc,, 1
N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), i.e., to determine whether discipline resulted from union activity or
some independent cause. By contrast, no reference was made to cases In which some
economic penalty was evident but a motive to encourage or discourage membership by
means of that penalty was not. Yet it is impossible to conclude that the Board Intended
this summary as a rejection of its prior decisions in cases such as Republic Aviation, Star
Publishing and General Electric, where violations were held to have been committed
despite the obvious absence of the proscribed motive,
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motive" cases: "a preponderance of the evidence [must] show an em-
ployer's illegal motive in order to show a violation of 8(a)(3) except in
cases of per se violations such as the discharge of an employee admit-
tedly because of activities protected by the statute.4 7 The Board also
quoted, approvingly, its earlier statement that:
The employer is at all times free to discharge an employee for any
reason or for no reason, provided only that the discharge is not for
the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union membership, or
does not have the effect of otherwise interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.48
Either motive or effect, accordingly, was posited as satisfying all statu-
tory requirements as to "encouragement or discouragement" of mem-
bership.49
It is important to an understanding of the sweeping language of the
1950 Annual Report to bear in mind the circumstances in which that
Report was written. A large percentage of the discrimination cases com-
ing before the Board in the early years of Taft-Hartley still involved
an issue of fact, i.e, was a discharge the result of joining a union or,
for example, lack of ability? The Board utilized motive (most fre-
47. 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 162 (1951) (emphasis added).
48. Id. (emphasis added), quoting from Fairchild Cafeteria, 92 N.LR.B. 809 (1950).
49. The implicit reservation thus expressed was perhaps necessitated by the fact that
the same Report in the same section highlighted a series of cases in wvhich employer
discipline of employees was held to be a violation despite the plain absence of an), Board
finding as to a motivation of encouraging or discouraging membership in a union. 16
NLRB ANN. REP. 171-73 (1951). Of these cases, in Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1950).
enforcement denied in part, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951), the employer's reason for im-posing certain disipline was that employees had engaged in a consumer boycott and were
attempting to gain recognition under circumstances which would expose the employer to
charges of a violation of Section 8(a)(2). The Board, in finding a Section 8(a)(3) violation,
did not, so far as the record shows, contest the fact that this was the motive for the
discipline but decided the case solely on the issue of whether the employee activity con-
cerned was "protected" within the meaning of the Act. In American Shuffleboard Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 1272, enforced sub nom. Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951), an em-
ployee was discharged on the ground that he had made false statements to the shop com-
mittee concerning "fantastic earnings" of the employer. The Board held that it 'was
"immaterial that the Respondent may have acted upon a good faith belief" that the
statements were deliberately and maliciously false. In Electronics Equipment Co., 94
NaL.RB. 62 (1951), enforcement denied, 194 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1952), 205 F.2d 296 (2d Cir.
1953), a discharge for allegedly false and malicious statements .vas similarly treated. In
none of these cases did the Board attempt to construct an explicit or implicit illegal
motivation; its focus was essentially upon whether or not the discipline attached to
engagement in protected activity. Indeed, in Midland Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 455
(1951), discussed at the same point in the Sixteenth Annual Report, this was made even
clearer. In that case an employee was discharged because he had used profane and abusive
language in speaking With his employer. The Trial Examiner specifically found that there
was no showing of "anti-union animus" on the part of the employer. The Board affirmed
his dismissal of the complaint in this respect but added the caveat that it was not
determining the legality of such a discharge had the abusive language been uttered solely
in the course of grievance committee meetings or other protected activity.
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quently in the sense of general anti-union animus) to resolve that fact
question. In the course of debates on the 1947 amendments, Congress
indicated its concern that the Board was too frequently translating gen-
eral animus into specific causation of a particular action. The Board,
defensive in the face of this criticism, made valiant attempts to defend
the propriety of its resolution of this type of dispute by emphasizing
that it did not conclude an individual had been discharged because of
his union activities in a dubious situation unless anti-union motivation
was well established. An unfortunate result of the Board's defensiveness
was a set of over-statements which could be and were misread. The
Board's claim that it did not resolve questionable fact situations with-
out inquiry into motivation was taken as an affirmation of reliance
upon motivation as a necessary element of any violation of Section8(a)(3.
It was at this point that the Supreme Court, in Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB,50 first addressed itself directly to the problem. Radio Officers
constituted the title case of a group of three decisions issued simulta-
neously by the Court, each of which touched in some degree upon the
elements of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). Their fact patterns are deserv-
ing of detailed review.
Radio Officers. William Christian Fowler, a member of the Radio
Officers' Union, accepted an offer of employment from the Bull Steam-
ship Company without a clearance for the assignment from his union.
The union considered this otherwise insignificant personnel change of
some consequence; first, Fowler's employment meant the "bumping"
or loss of income of another union member and second, such individual
arrangements conflicted, in the union's opinion, with its contractual
right to supervise such placements. The contract, in this respect, com-
mitted the company to "select such Radio Officers who are members of
the Union in good standing" whenever a vacancy occurred. The con-
tract also allowed the company a "right of free selection" providing
those it hired were in good standing with the union; the union agreed
to grant clearances to such members and to notify an employer when
an individual no longer possessed "good standing." Fowler undeniably
possessed such standing at the time he accepted the assignment with
Bull. He was, nevertheless, suspended from membership because of the
"bumping" and the absence of clearance. Fowler, as a "company stiff,"
was subsequently barred by the union from any future employment
with Bull although he was cleared for jobs with other employers. A
50. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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majority of the Board found that this action by the union violated both
Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2); Fowler did not charge the company
with any unfair labor practices.
Teamsters and Gaynor News. The companion cases likewise involved
union actions adversely affecting terms and conditions of employment
of individual employees. In NLRB v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,51 a union member's seniority standing was reduced by his
employer on demand of his union because of delinquency in dues pay-
ments. The contract between the employer and the union granted the
latter ultimate authority to determine seniority standing although it
did not contain a lawful union security provision. The Board found
that the union's action in increasing the charging party's vulnerability
to layoff because of his failure to meet his union obligations was a vio-
lation of Sections 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A). In Gaynor News Co. v.
NLRB,52 an employer was the respondent. The charging party, who
was not a member of the union, had been denied certain wage and
vacation payments made exclusively to union members under the terms
of the collective bargaining contract. The Board concluded that this
denial violated Section 8(a)(3) as well as Sections 8(a)(1) and (2).
All three of the cases before the Court, accordingly, involved eco-
nomic punishment inflicted upon an individual employee by an em-
ployer because of union action. Whether the punishment constituted
"discrimination" in the sense of disparate treatment was at least argu-
able in Radio Officers and Teamsters; the charging parties were, after
all, not treated any differently than any other employee who "bumped"
a fellow union member or neglected to pay his dues on time.0 The
Court, however, apparently interpreted "discrimination" as more prop-
erly definable in the sense of punitive action, concluding briefly that
"involuntary reduction of seniority, refusal to hire for an available job,
and disparate wage treatment are dearly discriminatory."54 In dispos-
ing of an even thornier problem, the Court also gave a broad reading
to the phrase "to encourage or discourage membership in a labor orga-
nization." Since the employees in both Radio Officers and Teamsters
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The proper definition of "discrimination," indeed, is a matter worthy of study as an
issue in itself. No attempt has been made herein to isolate and discuss in detail the
question of whether "discrimination" has been applied uniformly as a term of reference
by either the NLRB or the courts. For some of the complexities of the problem, se
Getman, Section S(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32
U. Cm. L. REv. 735, 737-38 (1965). See also Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 US. at
39-40 &- n.39.
54. 347 US. at 39.
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were union members both before and after the union action giving
rise to their complaint, under a literal interpretation of the statute
their membership was neither encouraged nor discouraged. The Court,
however, found this an overly restrictive view and held that efforts
designed to ensure compliance with union obligations and practices
are encompassed within the term "encouragement."O
These questions settled, the Court turned to the place and proof of
motive in Section 8(a)(8) and 8(b)(2) violations, issues which had given
rise to conflicting views at the circuit court level:
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ... [in Teamsters]
held that express proof that employer discrimination had the ef-
fect of encouraging or discouraging employees in their attitude to-
ward union membership is an essential element to establish vio-
lation of this section. That holding conflicts with the holdings of
the Second Circuit. .. [in Radio Officers and Gaynor] that such
employee encouragement or discouragement may be inferred from
the nature of the discrimination .... In reaching its decision in
Gaynor, the Second Circuit also rejected the contention, which
contention is supported by many decisions of the Courts of Ap-
peals, that there can be no violation of § 8(a)(3) unless it is shown
by specific evidence that the employer intended his discriminatory
action to encourage or discourage union membership60
Two quite separate questions were thus posed. First, must the Board
furnish "express proof" that discrimination resulted in actual encour-
agement or discouragement of union membership? Second, must the
Board furnish "specific evidence" that this result was intended? In
short, are either effect or a motive to secure that effect (or both) ele-
ments of the statutory prohibition which can be furnished by infer-
ence and by expertise, or must they be established by evidence spread
upon a record?
By presenting these questions as issues of proof, of course, the Court
implicitly accepted both motive and effect as essential elements of a
violation of Section 8(a)(3); the nature and quantum of their eviden-
tiary support would otherwise be of little consequence. Justice Reed,
writing for the majority of the Court, proceeded to spell out these ele-
ments in some detail. In a section headed "Necessity for Proving Em-
ployer's Motive," he first observed that the "relevance" of motivation
in cases of discrimination had been consistently recognized. This rela-
55. 347 U.S. at 39-40. In Gaynor, moreover, the possibility was suggested that the union
did not wish to accept any new members. Id. at 38.
56. Id. at 20-24.
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tively mild statement was quickly followed by a far broader conclusion:
"That Congress intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to
be controlling is dear."57 Justice Reed's authority for this flat statement
was a wide range of Board, judicial and congressional references. s As
has been pointed out, however, these references concerned a very dif-
ferent proposition than that for which Justice Reed cited them. State-
ments that a violation exists if there is improper motive are quite dif-
ferent from decisional or legislative authority for the proposition that
improper motive must always exist. Justice Reed's opinion, nonethe-
less, assumed otherwise.0 9
Having posited "motive" as an essential element of Section 8(a)(3)
violations, Justice Reed was confronted with two further questions.
The first was how to account for previous decisions which had found
violations of that section without reference to motive. The second was
the question of the type and quantum of evidence necessary to prove
motive in Section 8(a)(3) cases. His attempts to dispose of these issues
required consideration of another aspect of the controversy, the rela-
tionship between motive and effect.
[It is also dear that specific evidence of intent to encourage or
discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation
of § 8(a)(3) .... Both the Board and the courts have recognized
that proof of certain types of discrimination satisfies the intent
requirement. This recognition that specific proof of intent is un-
necessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or dis-
courages union membership is but an application of the common-
law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequence
of his conduct. [citations omitted] Thus an employer's protestation
that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be unavail-
ing where a natural consequence of his action was such encour-
agement or discouragement. Concluding that encouragement or
discouragement will result, it is presumed that he intended such
57. Id. at 44.58. See pp. 1282-83 supra. Prime reliance was placed upon quotations from the Senate
Report on the Wagner Act such as: "Of course nothing in the bill prevents from advancinghim for special aptitude; or from demoting him for failure to perform." S. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11. The Fifteenth Annual Report, however, uas referred to imme-diately before Justice Reed's quoted finding that motive is "controlling" and was pre-
sumably also relied upon. Prior to these references, Justice Reed cited a number of circuit
court decisions as well as, among other authorities, the articles by Professor Cox, supra
note 36, and Chester Ward, supra note 32.
59. There was, of course, some excuse for the Court's confusion as to these two aspects
of motivation. Infliction of a penalty against a man because he has joined a union may
well normally subsume an intent to discourage his membership. That an action imposing
some disadvantage relating to union activity might not so implicitly enfold a desire to
discourage membership in a labor organization was perhaps not so clear at the time
Justice Reed wrote as it is at the present.
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consequence. In such circumstances intent to encourage is suffi-
ciently established.60
Republic Aviation was relied upon to sustain this principle. In the
Court's retrospective view of that case, it did not matter that the em-
ployer "did not intend to discourage membership since such was a
foreseeable result."6' Applying the same approach to Gaynor the Court
concluded: "No more striking example of discrimination so foresee-
ably causing employee response as to obviate the need for any other
proof of intent is apparent than the payment of different wages to union
employees doing a job than to nonunion employees doing the same
job."62
The Court thus held, at a minimum, that once "certain types" of
discrimination have been shown to exist, no separate evidence of moti-
vation need be shown because the foreseeable consequences of the
discrimination necessarily supply the requisite intent. Justice Reed
did not indicate with any clarity what "types" of discrimination sup-
plied their own proof of motivation nor, among other matters, whether
the intent so established was always, never, or sometimes rebuttable.
Leaving these questions unanswered, if it saw them at all, the Court
moved to the further issue of what proof of effect, apart from proof of
motive, is essential to a finding of violation of Sections 8(a)(3) or
8(b)(2).
Petitioners in both Gaynor and Radio Officers contend that the
Board's orders in these cases should not have been enforced by the
Second Circuit because the records do not include "independent
proof that encouragement of Union membership actually oc-
curred." The Eighth Circuit subscribed to this view that such
independent proof is required in Teamsters when it denied en-
forcement of the Board's order in that proceeding on the ground
that it was not supported by substantial evidence of encourage-
ment. The Board argues that actual encouragement need not be
proved but that a tendency to encourage is sufficient, and "such
tendency is sufficiently established if its existence may reasonably
be inferred from the character of the discrimination."' 3
Here again, as in the case of motive, Justice Reed concluded that
both the legislative history and prior interpretations of the statute dis-
closed no need for direct evidence of the result of an act of discrimina-
60. 347 U.S. at 44-45.
61. Id. at 46.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 48.
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tion. In the Court's view, this conclusion was reinforced by both the
nature of the administrative process 4 and the nature of the prohibition
itself.
Encouragement and discouragement are "subtle things" requir-
ing "a high degree of introspective perception." ... But, as noted
above, it is common experience that the desire of employees to
unionize is raised or lowered by the advantages thought to be at-
tained by such action. Moreover, the Act does not require that
the employees discriminated against be the ones encouraged for
purposes of violations of § 8(a)(3). Nor does the Act require that
change in employees' "quantum of desire" to join a union have
immediate manifestations.65
Applying this analysis to the three fact patterns before it, the Court
concluded that a "natural result" of disparate wage treatment, denial
of an available job, and reduction of seniority would be an increase
in the desire of the discriminatees and their fellow employees to join
a union or to perform obligations of union membership. Therefore:
Since encouragement of union membership is obviously a natural
and foreseeable consequence of any employer discrimination at
the request of a union, those employers must be presumed to have
intended such encouragement. It follows that it was eminently
reasonable for the Board to infer encouragement of union mem-
bership, and the Eighth Circuit erred in holding encouragement
not proved.66
The Court's conclusions as to motive and effect as announced in
Radio Officers thus established the following broad rules:
Both an intent to secure, and an effect of, encouragement or discour-
agement of union membership are essential elements in the violation.
But, either motive or effect may be established without need of spe-
cific evidence where the "natural and foreseeable consequence" of the
discriminatory act will be to increase or decrease the desire to achieve
membership or to submit to union rules and discipline.
Further, the employees discriminated against need not be those
found to be encouraged or discouraged; nor need an immediate effect
of discouragement or encouragement be shown.
Justices Black and Douglas, in dissent, flatly challenged the majority
conclusion as to the Board's authority to avoid direct proof of motive.
They read the statute as forbidding discrimination only when it is
64. Id. at 48-49.
65. Id. at 51.
66. Id. at 52.
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utilized "in order to" encourage or discourage union membership. 7
As none of the three fact patterns before the Court showed any such
specific intent and, indeed, perhaps controverted it, the dissenters
would have denied enforcement of the Board order in each.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion in Radio Offi-
cers. After recasting the issues dealt with by the majority, he adopted
an approach that, taken literally, seemed to require only a showing of
effect and to be unconcerned with motivation. Indeed, he commented
that "[i]n many cases a conclusion by the Board that the employer's acts
are likely to help or hurt a union will be so compelling that a further
and separate finding characterizing the employer's state of mind would
be an unnecessary and a fictive formality." s Justice Frankfurter's happy
talent for phrasemaking sometimes delights the ear while simultane-
ously clouding the vision. If motive may be disregarded, for purposes
of Board findings, when it is a "fictive formality," the implication is
that it may not be so disregarded where it is not; in short, it remains
an essential element of the violation except where it seems implicit in
the result of the discrimination itself. If the latter is the case, there is
little to differentiate the Frankfurter position from that stated for the
Court by Justice Reed. And, indeed, Justice Frankfurter concludes
his concurrence with the comment that "[w)hat I have written and the
Court's opinion, as I read it, are not in disagreement."00
The real significance of the concurring opinion, however, is that
Justice Frankfurter, unlike Justice Reed, specifically acknowledged
the possibility that an inference as to motive or effect might be rebut-
table:
In sum, any inference that may be drawn from the employer's
alleged discriminatory acts is just one element of evidence, which
may or may not be sufficient, without more, to show a violation.
But that should not obscure the fact that this inference may be
bolstered or rebutted by other evidence which may be adduced,
and which the Board must take into consideration."0
Thus, while a raise in wages given only to union members is prima
facie suspect, Justice Frankfurter suggested that "the employer, by
67, Id. at 57-58.
68. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 57.
70. The Board's task is to weigh everything before it, including those inferences
which, with its specialized experience, it believes can fairly be drawn. On the basis
of this process, it must determine whether the alleged discriminatory acts of the
employer were such that he should have reasonably anticipated that they would
encourage or discourage union membership.
Id. at 56-57.
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introducing other facts, may be able to show that the raise was so
patently referable to other considerations, unrelated to his views on
unions and within his allowable freedom of action, that the Board
could not reasonably have concluded that his conduct would encourage
or discourage union membership."-' His opinion, however, does not
indicate with any certainty whether such evidence would dispel an
inference of effect, or of motive, or an inference as to both. Indeed,
the possibility exists that Justice Frankfurter viewed effect and motive
as inseparable.
C. Stage Three-Motive by Inference from Effect
While Radio Officers thus identified motive as an essential element
of a Section 8(a)(3) violation, the Board was not slow to take advantage
of the corollary holding that the required intent could be supplied by
inference from the effect of particular types of discrimination. The
usage the Board made of such inference is aptly illustrated by two dif-
ferent lines of decision. The first of these involved employer lockouts
in response to "whipsaw" strikes. The second concerned union super-
vision over the hiring process through the device of the hiring hall.
As of 1954 the lockout, as an employer weapon in labor-management
disputes, had been found by the Board in most circumstances to con-
stitute a violation of the Act.72 In that year, however, in Buffalo Linen
Supply Co.,73 the Board acknowledged an important exception for
a lockout in response to a "whipsaw" strike called against one em-
ployer (but not conducted against other companies) in a multi-
employer bargaining unit. The question for decision was whether the
lockouts had been defensive in nature and hence privileged, or retalia-
tory and unlawful. Lacking proof of actual motive, the Board turned
to inference. The necessary and even calculated implication of a strike
against one employer, it found, was a threat of future strike action
against other members of the employer bargaining unit. Emphasizing
the lack of evidence of any antiunion motivation, the Board found it
"more reasonable" to believe that the lockout was impelled by real
fear of fragmentation of the bargaining unit than a desire to punish
71. Id. at 56.
72. For a comprehensive survey of the Board's approach in this area, see Meltzer
Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft.Hartley Act, 24 U. Ciu. L.
REv. 70 (1956); Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28
U. CHI. L. REv. 614 (1961); Meltzer, Lockouts: Licit and Illicit, in N.Y.U. 1Wri ANN. CoxF.
ON LABOR 19 (1963).
73. 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), enforcement denied sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 449 v.
NLRB, 231 F 2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 US. 87 (1957).
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employees for resorting to a strike.74 The Second Circuit refused to
accept this conclusion and found that, as there was "no economic jus-
tification for the lockout," it constituted an interference with the right
to strike, "thereby" discouraging membership in the union.5
This decision was reversed with Justice Brennan writing for a unani-
mous Court.70 Adopting without question the Board's finding that the
lockout had not been precipitated by anti-union motivation, Justice
Brennan focused his attention on an evaluation of the respective in-
terests sought to be protected by the weapons of self-help used by the
parties-the strike and the lockout. Examination of the legislative his-
tory of the Wagner Act and its 1947 amendments revealed no congres-
sional intent to prohibit the lockout per se77 or to condemn the practice
of multi-employer bargaining:78 conversely, the Court recognized the
undisputed right of employees to initiate an economic strike to secure
disputed contract benefits. Thus, since both the strike and the lockout
constituted economic weapons not in themselves outlawed by the stat-
ute, the Court concluded that the legality of the employer's conduct
could be determined only by a "balancing of the conflicting legitimate
interests. ' 79 Taking the view that the "difficult and delicate" responsi-
bility of striking this balance had been delegated primarily to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board subject to limited judicial review, the
Court concluded that the Board in Buffalo Linen had properly exe-
cuted the congressional mandate.
Beyond characterizing the case as one involving no explicit evidence
of anti-union animus, Justice Brennan did not mention, as such, the
factor of motivation. Focus upon the presence of "legitimate" interests,
of course, could constitute a form of inquiry into motive or intent,
particularly if the alleged economic justifications for union and em-
ployer conduct must be inferable from that conduct itself, as Justice
Brennan's opinion suggests. But the basic thrust of the decision in Buf-
74. Id. at 448.
75. Truck Drivers Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
76. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
77. Id. at 92-93.
78. Id. at 95.
79. Although the Act protects the right of the employees to strike in support of
their demands, this protection is not so absolute as to deny self-help by employcrs
when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide. Conflict may arise, for
example, between the right to strike and the interest of small employers in preserving
multi-employer bargaining as a means of bargaining on an equal basis with a large
union and avoiding the competitive disadvantages resulting from non-uniform con-
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falo Linen is plainly on effect rather than motive. The case turned
upon a choice between competing economic interests uncomplicated
by the necessity of inferring an unlawful intent not visible on the
printed record.
In contrast to the Board's approach in Buffalo Linen, decisions deal-
ing with union hiring halls during the same period relied heavily upon
both an inferred effect of encouragement of union membership and
an inferred motive to encourage the same. In Mountain Pacific Chap-
ter,80 certain contractors signed a collective bargaining agreement mak-
ing recruitment of employees "the responsibility of the Union." While
the contract did not, on its face, limit employment to union members
or give them preference, the union admitted that in fact its hiring
practices were designed to give its members precedence.8' Nonetheless,
the Board chose to decide the case without reference to this evidence
of discrimination in the actual hiring practice.852 Relying on Radio Of-
ficers, the Board concluded that, without the inclusion of certain spe-
cific safeguards in a hiring hall agreement,8 a contract granting a union
control of hiring must necessarily encourage union membership in
violation of the statute:
The Employers here have surrendered all hiring authority to the
Union and have given advance notice via the established hiring
hall to the world at large that the Union is arbitrary master and is
contractually guaranteed to remain so. From the final authority
over hiring vested in the Respondent Union by the three AGC
80. Mountain Pac. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.LR.B. 833
(1957), enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
81. The Union admitted that in doing the hiring for the Employers it ahays hires
its members in preference to non-members, and that whenever a member is not
immediately available, it attempts to locate one, and only failing in the search does
it ever refer a non-union member to any assignment.
Id. at 894 n.3.
82. Id. In NLRB v. Mountain Pac. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 270
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959), enforcement of the Board's original decision and order was
denied and the case remanded to it for further findings. The Board, upon reconsideration,
again found a violation, but did so on the basis of findings of actual discrimination. It
noted, however, that it did not agree with the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the per se
approach. Mountain Pac. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 127 N.LR.B. 1393
(1960), enforcement denied in part, 306 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1962).
83. These safeguards consisted of explicit provision in the hiring hall agreement that(1) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a non-discriminatory basis
and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, union membership, by-laws, rules,
regulations, constitutional provisions, or any other aspect or obligation of union
membership, policies, or requirements.
(2) The employer retains the right to reject any job applicant referred by the union.
(3) The parties to the agreement post in places where notices to employees and appli-
cants for employment are customarily posted, all provisions relating to the functioning
of the hiring arrangement, including the safeguards that we deem essential to the
legality of an exclusive hiring agreement.
119 N.L.R.B. at 897.
1293
The Yale Law Journal
chapters, the inference of encouragement of union membership
is inescapable.8 4
The inference, however, proved not so "inescapable" to the Supreme
Court.
Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB 8 was the eventual test case for Su-
preme Court review of the Mountain Pacific doctrine. Local 357 in-
volved a collective bargaining contract by which the signatory em-
ployers were required to use the union's hiring hall for employment
of casual employees. Unlike the agreement in Mountain Pacific, the
contract in Local 357 specified that dispatching from the hall was to
be determined by the relative seniority of men on an "available list,"
"irrespective of whether such employee is or is not a member of the
Union."8 6 Lester Slater, a member of the union, procured employment
from a signatory employer without recourse to the hiring hall. The
conditions precedent to hiring outside the hall were not operative in
his case, and he was discharged on union demand. Since the contractual
safeguards 7 which it had posited as essential in Mountain Pacific were
admittedly lacking in the agreement under which Slater was discharged,
the Board found the contract and the termination in violation of the
Act without further inquiry into the facts of the discharge itself.
Except that Local 357 involved a true hiring hall contract, plainly
requiring use of the union's dispatching service, the unauthorized hir-
ing and union-procured discharge in the case closely resembled the
facts of Radio Officers.8 8 Justice Douglas, however, writing for the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, took an approach in Local 357 which
marked a critical if subtle withdrawal from the broad holding of the
earlier case. While not directly disturbing the holding in Radio Off-
84. Id. at 896.
85. 365 U.S. 667 (1961). In a companion case, Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
651 (1961), the Court rejected the broad-gauge "remedy" which the Board had applied in
cases where an illegal hiring hail was found to exist under Mountain Pacific. In PJrown-
Olds, 115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956), the Board had held that in such instances the union was to
be required to refund dues, assessments, and fees to all employees who had made such
payments to the unioh under the contract, rather than limiting reimbursement to those
individuals who were directly shown to have been coerced. The Court considered such ani
order to be punitive rather than remedial and thus beyond the scope of the Board's powers.
"Where no membership in the union was shown to be influenced or compelled by reason
of any unfair labor practice, no 'consequences of violation' are removed by the order
compelling the union to return all dues and fees collected from the members, and no
'dissipation' of the effects of the prohibited action is achieved." 365 U.S. at 655.
86. 365 U.S. at 668.
87. See note 86 supra.
88. In both cases a union member obtained employment by individual action although
a collective bargaining agreement existed which the union interpreted as giving It the
right to supervise such hiring. In both cases the employer capitulated to a union demand
that the employment be terminated.
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cers that both motive and effect are essential but provable by inference
rather than direct evidence, the Douglas view constituted a warning
that the power to infer was not unlimited.
In Radio Officers, a union demand that one of its members be de-
nied employment was accepted as constituting "discrimination." The
resulting loss of earnings due to union action was then found to be
an inherent encouragement of union membership in the sense of im-
pelling greater obedience by the member. Having thus established dis-
crimination with an inherent effect of encouragement of membership,
Radio Officers completed the formula by inferring the requisite motive
from the effect. In Local 357, however, Justice Douglas undercut the
chain of inference by refusing to assume that union-dictated termina-
tion necessarily constituted discrimination. Taking the view that the
term "discrimination" referred to different treatment of union and
non-union members rather than to disparate treatment of any two
groups of employees generally,s9 Justice Douglas found that while the
Board could properly conclude that a hiring hall would encourage
union allegiance, it could not, without other evidence, infer that a
union would necessarily distinguish between members and non-mem-
bers in the process of dispatching employees. At least, such an inference
could not be drawn in this particular situation; "surely discrimination
cannot be inferred from the face of the instrument when the instru-
ment specifically provides that there will be no discrimination against
'casual employees' because of the presence or absence of union member-
ship." 90
Taken at its narrowest, Local 357 stands for the proposition that an
inference of discrimination (or, possibly, effect and motive) is rebut-
table. The Board, however, appears to have interpreted the decision
in far broader fashion. As summarized by former General Counsel
Rothnan,9' the reaction of the agency was to conclude that Local 357
89. Justice Clark, dissenting in Local 357 together with Justice Whittaker, noted this
departure from the definition employed in Radio Officers and urged a return to the
broader view of that case. "Discrimination," he asserted, means "to distinguish or dif-
ferentiate." 365 U.S. at 689. Such discrimination in Local357 was supplied by the existence
of two groups of men differently affected by the hiring hall: those who received referral
cards and those, including Slater, who did not. Thus the only real question was whether
such discrimination "is designed to, or inherently tends to, encourage union membership."
Id. at 690. The answer Justice Clark found amply established by both the testimony of
Lester Slater and the Board's expertise. Id. at 691-92. He concluded, accordingly, following
Radio Officers, that once two groups of emplo)yees are treated differently, all that is
necessary for a violation is an intended or implicit effect of encouragement or discourage-
ment of membership.
90. Id. at 675.
91. Rothman, The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring
Hall Arrangements, 48 VA. L. REv. 871 (1962).
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required independent evidence of discrimination as to individual em-
ployees in all hiring hall cases. In short, the Board construed the deci-
sion as requiring (or allowing) it to ignore even a plainly discrimina-
tory hiring hall contract unless it could separately prove that an
individual's specific discharge or failure to be dispatched was, of itself,
discriminatory.9 2 That construction, obviously, not only ignored Jus-
tice Douglas' specific statement that "discrimination may at times be
inferred by the Board" but also disregarded the fact that it was the
contractual disclaimer of discrimination which was found to be con-
trolling by the majority opinion in Local 357.
A concurrence filed in Local 357 by Justice Harlan, and joined by
Justice Stewart, is worthy of special notice. 93 Justice Harlan agreed
with the majority that this particular contract would not allow the
Board to infer an "intent on the part of employer or union to dis-
criminate in favor of union status."94 Unlike the majority, however,
the concurring Justices went on to consider what limits might also
attach to the Board's authority to infer the elements of motive and ef-
fect as to encouragement and discouragement of union membership.
In so doing, Justice Harlan advanced a new and restrictive view of the
Board's powers. While not challenging the propriety of inferring an
effect of encouragement of membership through the hiring hall, the
92. See, e.g., Pan Atlantic S.S. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 868 (1961) where, despite the fact that
the hiring hall was dearly unlawful, the Board concluded that the failure of the hall to
dispatch the charging party was not due to any unlawful discrimination.
93. The separate opinion observed that it was made necessary by the need to give
explicit articulation" to certain considerations felt to be "implicit" in the majority
determination. 365 U.S. at 677.
94. 365 U.S. 679. The statement by Justice Harlan as to an "intent to discriminate" is
somewhat puzzling. The majority opinion was directed to the absence of record evidence
as to the fact of discrimination rather than an absent desire to discriminate. Analysis of
Justice Harlan's views is also made difficult by the fact that his opinion (like that of the
majority) uses the term "discrimination" as though it only referred to differences in treat-
ment of union and non-union employees. "Discrimination," however, as Radio Officers
itself indicated, see note 89 supra, may take place in other contexts. The confusion thus
created is illustrated by the following passage from the concurrence:
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that what is involved in the general
requirement of finding of forbidden motivation, as well as in the limited scope of the
heretofore recognized exceptions to this general requirement, is a realization that the
Act was not intended to interfere significantly with those activities of employer and
union which are justified by nondiscriminatory business purposes, or by nondiscrimi-
natory attempts to benefit all the represented employees . . . . We must determine
whether the Board's action is consistent with the balance struck by the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts between protection of employee freedom with respect to union
activity and the privilege of employer and union to make such nondiscriminatory
decisions as seem to them to satisfy best the needs of the business and the employees,
Id. at 682. If the actions to which Justice Harlan was referring are, in fact, nondiscrimi-
natory, Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) are by their own terms inapplicable and the problem
he posed does not exist. The most plausible conclusion is that Justice Harlan used
"nondiscriminatory" in the sense of an act which is not intended to encourage or dis-
courage union membership but which may do so in actual effect.
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concurring opinion rejected the possibility of inferring motive from
that effect unless the hiring hall could be found to be "without sub-
stantial justification in terms of legitimate employer or union pur-
poses."' 95 In sum, the concurrence required the Board to establish the
requisite motive either by direct evidence or by an effect of encourage-
ment plus an absence of any "legitimate" explanation for the discrimi-
nation.
While Justice Frankfurter's clouded caveat in Radio Officers as to
the possibly rebuttable nature of inferences drawn from effect was not
mentioned, it was this possibility which was obviously the center of
the Harlan analysis. Justice Harlan's premise was that
a mere showing of foreseeable encouragement of union status is
not a sufficient basis for a finding of violation of the statute. It
has long been recognized that an employer can make reasonable
business decisions, unmotivated by an intent to discourage union
membership or protected concerted activities, although the fore-
seeable effect of these decisions may be to discourage what the act
protects.96
He suggested two criteria for judging what actions should be immu-
nized from the illegality which would otherwise flow from their in-
herent effect upon union membership. First, the action must have a
"business justification." Second, it must be for a "significant" and
"legitimate" purpose.
The sources cited for these criteria were questionable, to say the
least. Republic Aviation7 and three circuit court decisions98 were
mustered in support of the assertion that only in the absence of busi-
iness justification will effect be allowed to supply motivation by infer-
ence. Yet in each of the cases cited, the employer had strenuously and
plausibly argued that the action in question had been taken for a
normal business purpose.9 9 Even so, in each of these cases the requisite
95. Id. at 684.
96. Id. at 679.
97. P. 1277 supra.
98. NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953); Cusano v. NLRB,
190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir.
1947).
99. In Republic Aviation, for example, the employer's claim was that his no-solicitation
rule was designed to keep all solicitors off his property in order to protect his business.
In the companion LeTourneau case, the Court itself noted that the rule had been
adopted to "control littering and petty pilfering from parked autos .... " 324 U.S. at 797.
In the other decisions relied upon by Justice Harlan, company action was based upon a
desire to retain control over alleged supervisors (Allis-Chalmers 'Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, note
98 supra), an honest but mistaken belief that an employee had uttered false statements
as to the company's profits (Cusano v. NLRB, note 98 supra) and an honest but mistaken
belief that an employee had thrown tacks in the street before the company's plant (NLRB
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motive had been established by inference under the Radio Officers
thesis. Justice Harlan's second criterion-that the action be for an aim
both significant and legitimate-was supported by similarly shaky prece-
dent. The authority relied upon was Gaynor News,100 in which the pay-
ment of different wage scales to union and non-union employees had
been held to be a violation of Section 8(a)(3). It is true that, in terms
of the Harlan thesis, such disparate treatment might be said to serve
an illegitimate end. Yet neither the text of the decision in Gaynor nor
that of its companion case Radio Officers indicates that the Court was
either explicitly or implicitly following the criterion which the Harlan
opinion projects.
Particular attention has been paid to the concurring opinion in Local
357 because its essential inquiry-the weighing of conflicting interests
in the absence of direct evidence of motive-has subsequently become
the basis for the competing views which have developed as to the proper
construction of Section 8(a)(3). Unless the opportunity for the Board
to infer motive from effect is narrowly limited, Justice Harlan pointed
out, the Court would be approving "a broad expansion of the power
of the Board to supervise nondiscriminatory decisions made by em-
ployer or union."' 01 Apart from the fact that "nondiscriminatory"
decisions would not-under the explicit terms of the statute-consti-
tute violations of Sections 8(a)(8) and 8(b)(2), it is plain that Justice
Harlan feared that the power to draw inferences would amount to the
power to control action. His concern, in this regard, as to the extent
to which the Board should be able to intervene on one side or the
other of labor disputes in a free industrial society was obviously shared
by other members of the Court. Only shortly before, the Board's reli-
ance upon inference and expertise in the area of good faith bargaining
had attracted the critical attention of the Court. 0 2 Clearly, both the
v. Industrial Cotton Mills, note 98 supra). It is difficult, in short, to find an absence of
"business justification" in any of these situations. Justice Harlan, in a subsequent case,
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), again found "no business justification"
in Cusano and "little business justification" in Industrial Cotton Mills. 379 U.S. at 25 %,2.
iQ0. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
101. 365 U.S. at 685.
102. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents Intl Union, 561 U.S. 477, 498 (1960), Justice Brennan
had cautioned that
[i]t is one thing to say that the Board has been afforded flexibility to determine, for
example, whether an employer's disciplinary action taken against specific workers is
permissible or not, or whether a party's conduct at the bargaining table evidences
a real desire to come into agreement. The statute in such areas clearly poses the
problem to the Board for its solution. [citing Buffalo Linen] And specifically we do
not mean to question in any way the Board's powers to determine the latter question,
drawing inferences from the conduct of the parties as a whole. It is quite another
matter, however, to say that the Board has been afforded flexibility in picking and
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majority opinion and the concurrence in Local 357 reflected a similar
concern with excessive "flexibility" on the part of the Board in unfair
labor practice areas as well.
D. Stage Four-The Balancing Process and the Thumb upon the
Scale
The question raised by Justice Harlan's first criterion-whether a
"business justification" is sufficient to override an inferred intention
to encourage or discourage union membership-was the basic issue
when the Court next considered the question of motivation under
Section 8(a)(3). In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,10 3 the company,
"under intense competition and subject to insistent demands from its
customers to maintain deliveries,"' 0 4 attempted to restore production
during a strike by announcing that replacements and strikers who re-
turned to work would receive twenty years of additional seniority for
credit against future layoffs. The device was a success, and the union,
forced to capitulate, pressed charges that the "superseniority" plan
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3). The Board found that the plan was
unlawful because it was inherently destructive of the right to strike,
and ruled that no specific evidence of the company's motivation was
necessary to sustain a Section 8(a)(3) violation in these circumstances.
The Third Circuit relied heavily upon the Harlan approach of
Local 357 in refusing to enforce the Board order. It concluded, in dis-
agreement with at least one other circuit, 05 that superseniority plans
were not unlawful absent evidence of an illegal motive in their pro-
mulgation and enforcement. The determining factor, in the Third Cir-
cuit's view, was the presence of a legitimate business reason for the
challenged act coupled with an absence of any Board finding of unlaw-
ful intent. 0 6 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that "the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that, in the absence of a finding of specific
illegal intent, a legitimate business purpose is always a defense to an
unfair labor practice charge."' 07
Justice White, writing for the Court, pointed out that under the
Radio Officers test intent can be proven either by direct evidence or
choosing which economic devices of labor and management shall be branded as
unlawful.
103. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
104. Id. at 222-23.
105. See Swarco, Inc. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 931(1963). See also NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951).
106. Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 359, .64 (2d Cir. 1962).
107. 373 U.S. at 227.
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by inference. If direct evidence is available, "business justifications,"
he found, become irrelevant. Where the element of motivation is sus-
tained only by inference, however, "business justifications" become a
key issue. If the employer fails to justify his actions, an unfair labor
practice charge is made out. If, on the other hand, he counters by ex-
plaining that his actions were taken in pursuit of legitimate business
ends, and that his dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to in-
vade union rights, his conduct requires further analysis. Whatever the
claimed overriding justification may be, the unavoidable consequences
of the employer's conduct-which he must have foreseen and must be
held to have intended-remain.108 In such circumstances the inquiry
becomes a matter of balancing the interests involved.
As is not uncommon in human experience, such situations present
a complex of motives and preferring one motive to another is in
reality the far more delicate task .. .of weighing the interest of
employees in concerted activity against the interest of the em-
ployer in operating his business in a particular manner and of
balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended con-
sequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be
served by the employer's conduct.10
Utilizing this approach, and agreeing with the Board that the super-
seniority plan in Erie Resistor had had a highly destructive impact
upon the strike, the Court concluded that "because the Board's judg-
ment was that the claimed business purpose would not outweigh the
necessary harm to employee rights.., it could properly put aside evi-
dence of respondent's motive and decline to find whether the conduct
was or was not prompted by the claimed business purpose."110
While still addressing the problem as one of "motive," then, Erie
Resistor candidly acknowledged that the real basis of judgment is a
weighing of conflicting interests. The Court explicitly accepted the
Harlan thesis that business justifications could rebut an inference of
intent where actual motive to encourage or discourage union member-
ship was not otherwise established. The presence or absence of a vio-
lation in such circumstances must rest upon the Board's expert assess-
ment of the impact of the discrimination on employee rights and upon
its determination as to whether or not that impact is outweighed by
the employer interests concerned.1
108. Id. at 227-28.
109. Id. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 236-37.
111. It must be observed that Justice White's opinion repeatedly refers to intent to dis.
criminate as well as intent to encourage or discourage union membership as though the
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The October 1964 term of the Court brought new, if hardly defini-
tive, treatments of the basic problem. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.W
was the hors d'oeuvre for what became a groaning banquet board of
litigation. In that case two employees, who had been active in an at-
tempt to organize the respondent's plant, were discharged as a result
of the employer's sincere but mistaken belief that they had threatened
to dynamite his plant if the organizational drive was unsuccessfu.ln 3
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, saw no need to reach the issue
of motive under Section 8(a)(3). A discharge for alleged misconduct
arising out of protected activity, he found, constitutes a violation of
the broader provisions of Section 8(a)(1) without reference to Section
8(a)(3), no matter what the employer's motive, when it is shown that
the misconduct never in fact occurred.114 The cases marshalled in sup-
port of this proposition were, however, all cases in which the Board
had found both Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) to have been violated.21 r
Justice Douglas did not bother to explore the circumstances in which
a discharge might be tested under the first of these two sections alone;
we have only his vague statement that "[w]e are not in the area of
management prerogatives" to explain the non-applicability of Section
8(a)(3) to the case before him."16
two were interchangeable in meaning. It is probable that Justice White considered the
former to mean "intent to discriminate because of union membership or activities."
112. 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
113. The Board concluded that both Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) had been violated.
The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board order in the absence of evidence that
the employer had intended to discourage protected activity by the discharge. In the view
of the Fifth Circuit, this was not a situation where, under the doctrine of Radio Officers,
motive could be inferred from effect; a "discharge does not inherently discourage union
membership." NLR.B v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 322 F.2d 57, 61 (1953). The Fifth Circuit's
opinion comes close to an assumption that even a discharge which has a substantial effect
upon encouragement or discouragement of membership will never be a violation without
proof of a motive to obtain that end:
Discharging an employee is not in itself discouraging to organizational or other
protected activities. In fact if it does discourage the discharged employee or his fellow
workers, it is not a violation of the Act if the employer's motivation was not dis-
criminatory. Wage and benefit differentials inherently discourage; a discharge does not
inherently discourage. The difference is crudal. In the latter situation, motivation is
determinative; in the former it is irrelevant. In this case the motivation was the
belief that men had threatened to dynamite property; the intent was to rid the plant
of those from whom the threat was believed to have emanated. We think it cannot
be said that this was discrimination discouraging protected activity.
Id. at 61. If the foregoing stands for the proposition that motive must alwa)s be directly
proven in discharge cases, it is in marked contrast to the approach of Radio Officers. The
latter decision was, interestingly enough, cited by the Fifth Circuit in Burnup & Sims. It
was distinguished, however, on the ground that it involved institution of discriminatory
wage increases. That, of course, was the fact pattern of Gaynor News, a companion case,
rather than Radio Officers.
114. 379 US. at 22-23.
115. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912 (1944); Standard Oil Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 783 (1950); Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 610 (1952), enforcement
denied, 203 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1953).
116. 379 U.S. at 24. Justice Harlan both concurred and dissented in part. His opinion
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Two other decisions delivered during the same term dealt squarely
with the issue of motive under Section 8(a)(3). The source of the liti-
gation in both instances was an employer lockout. In American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB1 7 the shutdown occurred after an impasse had
been reached in negotiations for a new collective bargaining contract.
NLRB v. Brown18 involved the temporary replacement of employees
who had been locked out by the non-struck members of a multi-
employer bargaining unit in response to a whipsaw strike. In both
cases the Board found that Section 8(a)(3) had been violated. In both
cases, the Supreme Court reversed. The decision of the majority in
each case, however, elicited separate opinions demonstrating a deep
division within the Court as to the place and role of motive.
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority in American Ship. As to Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), he found no evidence that the employer was hostile to
unions or that the lockout had been impelled by a desire to destroy
or frustrate collective bargaining. He held that, absent such a motive,
Section 8(a)(1) was not violated. The lockout is not "one of those acts
which is demonstrably so destructive of collective bargaining that the
Board need not inquire into employer motivation.""" As to Section
8(a)(3), Justice Stewart again concluded that some proof of unlawful
motivation was both necessary and absent. While in some cases "the
employer's conduct carries with it an inference of unlawful intention
so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's protes-
tations of innocent purpose,"'120 a bargaining lockout after impasse is
not such a case.' 2 '
In the Stewart view, accordingly, there is little if any difference in
the analysis of Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations. In both cases,
failure to prove an unlawful motive is fatal absent some inherent, se-
vere effect upon the exercise of Section 7 rights. The decision suggests,
without explicitly stating, that the presence of such a severe effect
cart be interpreted as suggesting that motive cannot be regarded as irrelevant under either
Section 8(a)(l) or Section 8(a)(3). His position, however, was not clear. Finding that "btl.
ness justifications" ekisted for the employer's action in Burnup & Sims, he contented him.
self with stating that "I do not believe that this case presents the rare situation In Mlhch
the Board can ignore motive." Id. at 25.
117. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
118. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
119, 380 U.S. at S09. Justice Stewart added: "we cannot see that the employer's use
of a lockout solely in support of a legitimate bargaining position is in any way Incon-
sistent with the right to bargain collectively or with the right to strike." Id. at 310.
120. Id. at 311-12.
121. Justice Stewart's reasoning was that "t]he purpose and effect of the lockout was
only to bring pressure upon the union to modify its demands." Id. at 312, There was no
discernible, let alone cataclysmic effect of discouragement of union membership nor was
the lockout without significant employer interest of an innocent variety.
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would establish a violation of Section 8(a)(1) without further inquiry.
Under Section 8(a)(3), such an effect would lead to a finding of viola-
tion (without actual proof of motive) unless a weighing of the legiti-
mate business ends claimed to be served impelled a contrary conclu-
sion.
Justice White, in concurrence, found Justice Stewart's emphasis
upon the absence of requisite proof of motive far too restrictive an
approach. In his view, "[t]he balance and accommodation of 'conflict-
ing legitimate interests' in labor relations does not admit of a simple
solution and a myopic focus on the true intent or motive of the em-
ployer has not been the determinative standard of the Board or this
Court."'-' 22 Impact, rather than motive, is crucial where direct inter-
ference with Section 7 rights results from an employer's attempt to
protect his economic position. In such instances, a balancing of the
respective interests is the proper basis of decision.m
Justice Goldberg also concurred separately in an opinion joined by
the Chief Justice. Justice Goldberg took particular exception to tie
majority requirement that motivation, under Sections 8(a)(1) and (3),
must be separately established unless the challenged conduct is "demon-
strably so destructive of collective bargaining" or "so prejudicial to
union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification" as
to overcome all protestations of innocent purpose. This construction
Justice Goldberg found in conflict with "both the letter and the spirit
of numerous prior decisions of the Court"; "the correct test for deter-
mining whether § 8(a)(1) has been violated in cases not involving an
employer anti-union motive is whether the business justification for
the employer's action outweighs the interference with § 7 rights in-
volved."'- I4 Where there is no significant business justification but the
action has an effect on Section 7 rights, it may be prohibited by Section
8(a)(1) even though less than "demonstrably... destructive of collec-
tive bargaining." Radio Officers and Erie Resistor, to Justice Goldberg,
established a similar test for Section 8(a)(3). Even without direct proof
of motive, violations of that section can occur apart from those "ex-
treme situations" where, in the language of the majority, the chal-
lenged conduct is "inherently prejudicial to union interest" and
122. 380 U.S. at 325.
123. Justice White noted in addition that this balancing process is one which the
Board is particularly equipped to perform, and cautioned that while it must of ourm be
liable to judicial review it should not be subject to judicial displacement. Justice Gold-
berg's concurrence made the same point.
124. Id. at 339.
1303
The Yale Law Journal
"devoid of significant economic justification."'125 A violation is estab-
lished without proof of motive whenever the effect on Section 7 rights,
whether great or limited, outweighs the actual (or alleged) justification
in the needs of the business.126
Much the same conflict of views was evident in NLRB v. Brown.
There the Court, through Justice Brennan, again found absence of
proof of improper motivation fatal to a Board finding of violations of
Sections 8(a)(1) and (3). Applying the American Ship tests, Justice
Brennan concluded that there was no Section 8(a)(1) violation, absent
proof of anti-union animus, because the use of replacements to keep
the locked-out stores in operation was neither "demonstrably so destruc-
tive of employee rights" nor "so devoid of significant service to any
legitimate business end" that it could not "be tolerated consistently
with the Act." Likewise there was no violation of Section 8(a)(3), As
no anti-union motivation had been shown, the replacements could not
be considered unlawful unless the only "reasonable inference" was that
the lockout had been directed against employees because of their exer-
cise of Section 7 rights and was "inherently destructive" of those rights.
This inference, the Court held, was not justified.
Several aspects of Justice Brennan's opinion in Brown deserve special
emphasis. At the very outset Justice Brennan reiterated the warning
previously voiced by the Court in Insurance Agents 27 that the Board,
in an attempt to achieve a fairer balance of power between unions and
employers, is not authorized to increase or decrease the economic pres-
sure either party can bring to bear in a labor dispute. Union and em-
ployer conduct must be judged on the basis of how far it may impede
or extinguish the exercise of a right under Section 7; it cannot be
judged on the basis of whether it will render concerted activity more
or less successful in achieving its economic ends. Though the Court
acknowledged that the use of replacements might have decreased the
possibility that the union could obtain the new contract terms it
sought, it found no violation because there had been no inherent or
proven inducement of employees to abandon collective bargaining as
such. The decision concluded by reiterating its preliminary caveat:
"Congress has not given the Board untrammelled authority to catalogue
which economic devices shall be deemed freighted with indicia of
unlawful intent."' 28
125. Id. at 540.
126. Id.
127. See note 99 supra.
128. 380 U.S. at 292.
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Justice Goldberg and Chief Justice Warren again concurred on the
ground that the damage, if any, resulting to employee rights through
the use of temporary replacements was outweighed by the employer's
economic interest in preserving the multi-employer bargaining unit
from fragmentation. While they agreed, accordingly, that there had
been no violation in Brown, the concurring Justices served notice that
their analysis of the requirements of Section 8(a)(3) would not always
permit a similar result. Their concurrence specifically observed that
"[t]here would be grave doubt as to whether locking out employees
and hiring permanent replacements is justified by any legitimate in-
terest of the nonstruck employers,' 2 an issue which the majority had
set aside as not presently before the Court. 30
Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,"' decided in the
same term, provided a further analysis of motive and effect in a deci-
sion which apparently but unaccountably represented the unanimous
view absent in American Ship and Brown. 32 Darlington deserves the
designation of a "celebrated" case on many grounds. Not the least of
these, of course, is the basic issue which it posed: can an employer with
impunity terminate his business rather than deal with a union? The
principals involved were each receptive to making organization of a
local textile mill the theatre for a labor-management Armageddon;
an industry fleeing southward for lower production costs and a union
in hot pursuit of the jobs of its members could not help but be vitally
interested in the outcome of the struggle. 33
Darlington was one of seventeen manufacturers controlled and oper-
129. Id. at 293.
130. 380 U.S. at 292 n.6. Justice White dissented in Brown after concurring in the
result in American Ship. The difference in his disposition of the two cases was not a
matter of approach but of the results obtaining from that approach. He again emphasized
that, as to both Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations, the damage done to employee rights
must be weighed against the service rendered to employer interests, a balancing d. which
is primarily the responsibility of the Board. Where, as in Amnerican Ship, the Board failed
properly to explicate the basis on which it had struck the balance, its decision could not
be sustained. In Brown, however, Justice White concluded that the Board had fully
established a reasonable basis for its conclusion that the use of replacements was more
injurious to employee rights than it was protective of employer interests.
131. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
132. Justices Stewart and Goldberg, however, did not participate in the decision in
Darlington.
133. The case also, in this regard, provides a classic example of the difficulties of
effective government regulation of labor-management relationships. The organizing drive
which gave rise to the dispute commenced in March, 1956. Twelve years later, the dispute
is yet to be finally resolved. At the end of the fifth hearing before him in the case, Trial
Examiner Lloyd Buchanan prefaced a seventy-three page review of the proceedings with
the comment that "these proceedings, unquestionably monumental, may become a monu-
ment to monumental futility" and further observed that "Darlington may yet become
an eponym for divagation and delay." Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision, August
15, 1966 (TXD-488-66), at 1, 2.
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ated by Deering Milliken and Company, a New York "selling house"
for the marketing of textiles. Six days after the Textile Workers Union
had been selected as the plant's exclusive bargaining representative
by a narrow majority of Darlington's employees, the Board of Directors
voted to close the plant and liquidate the corporation. Their action
was admittedly impelled by the conclusion of Roger Milliken, the
company's president, that unionization would prevent the plant from
remaining "competitive." The union charged, and the Board found,
that the Darlington closing had been in violation of Sections 8(a)(l)
and 8(a)(8). 134 A majority of the Board concluded that the shutdown
had been impelled by anti-union animus and that the larger Deering
Milliken enterprise was liable for the effects of the violation, The
Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that an employer possesses an
absolute right to close out a part or all of his business regardless of
his motives.135
Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court marked a significant narrow-
ing of the roles of motive and effect in establishing violations of Section
8(a)(3). He began by determining that the case must be within the am-
bit of Section 8(a)(3) restrictions rather than those of Section 8(a)(1).
Section 8(a)(1), he asserted, is violated
only when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the business
justification for the employer's action .... A violation of Section
8(a)(1) alone therefore presupposes an act which is unlawful even
absent a discriminatory motive.130
An employer's decision to terminate his business, however, is "so pecu-
liarly a matter of management prerogative" that it would never, taken
alone, be held to be outweighed by its impact upon Section 7 rights.
Only the added element of a motive to discriminate will suffice to
render the closing unlawful. And such action, if discriminatorily moti-
134. The Board also concluded that Darlington had committed a violation of Section
8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain with the union following the latter's certification. The
Court, however, brushed aside this aspect of the case on the ground that the refusal to
bargain was bottomed on the illegality of the plant closure and that "no argument is
made that Section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain concerning a purely business
decision to terminate his enterprise." 380 U.S. at 267 n.5.
135. 325 F.2d 682 (1963).
136. 380 U.S. at 268. This is in marked contrast to Justice Harlan's prior comments
(in his separate opinion in Burnup & Shns) that it was only in a "rare situation" that tile
Board may ignore motive. See note 116 supra. It is in even further marked contrast to his
opinion. for the full Court, in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co,, -375 U.S. 405 (1964), In wllch
a basic Section 8(a)(1) violation was ostensibly made totally dependent upon motive. lit
Exchange Parts the Court held that a grant of economic benefits to employees immediately
prior to an NLRB-conducted election was invalid if it was "for the purpose of inducing
employees to vote against the union." Id. at 409.
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vated, comes squarely under the terms of Section 8(a)(3)'s prohi-
bition.' 3 7 Thus where "business justifications" constitute "peculiarly
matters of management prerogative," only Section 8(a)(3) properly
applies. Section 8(a)(1) and its balancing of interests cannot be used in
such a closing case because the employer action, no matter how devas-
tating to the exercise of Section 7 rights, is so completely a managerial
prerogative as to immunize all but deliberate intent to curb those
rights.
The distinction thus drawn between the two sections is of critical
importance. The relationship of Section 8(a)(3) to the broader man-
date of Section 8(a)(1) is made dependent upon the simplistic and
highly subjective standard of those management and union actions
which are "peculiarly" essential to the running of the enterprise. If
the Board-or eventually the Court-senses that a particular action
involves the life of the enterprise deeply enough, motivation-together
with the remaining requirements of Section 8(a)(3)--becomes a deter-
minative factor as to the legality of that act. No guides are suggested
for the approach taken to this enormously complex problem; 3 ' the
decision, instead, comes perilously close to establishing administrative
or judicial "intestinal fortitude" as the controlling factor. Furthermore,
the weighing of which subjects are "peculiarly matters of managerial
prerogatives" is a process intimately involving the power balance be-
tween employee and employer interests-an area which the Court had
previously declared to be beyond the proper scope of Board and judi-
cial control. 3 9
In any case, Justice Harlan, as noted above, viewed the Darlington
shutdown as solely a Section 8(a)(3) problem. In applying the terms
of that section to the fact pattern before the Court, his decision added
an entirely new gloss to prior rulings as to motive and effect. On its
face the case certainly seemed to present all the elements of an 8(a)(3)
violation. That there was "discrimination" seems hardly contestable
whatever definition of that term is used; the Darlington employees
were accorded significantly different treatment after choosing to be
137. 380 US. at 269.
138. See, e.g., the long and intricate struggles of both the Board and the Court with
the issue of what constitutes "mandatory" as opposed to "non-mandatory" subjects of
bargaining. Citation of even the major decisions in this struggle would consume entirely
too much space herein. A few classic cases such as Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warer Corp., 856 U.S.
342 (1958), and NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), are illustrative of
the basic difficulties. See also Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 HInv. L. REv. 389 (1950).
189. See notes 127-28 supra.
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represented by a union. The discrimination took place as to their ten-
ure of employment. It was probably motivated by their selection of a
union. As to those employees who lost their jobs, accordingly, there
can be no question that their act of becoming union members resulted
in punishment. Nor can it be doubted that the termination of their
employment discouraged the dischargees in their affiliation with the
union. The case, accordingly, would appear to be a classic situation
in which both the motive and the effect of discouragement were incon-
testably present.
The opinion in Darlington, however, adopted a premise which nec-
essarily required a revision of these otherwise accepted principles: "A
proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of busi-
ness if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that
it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legis-
lative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor
Relations Act."1 40 Neither such legislative intent nor unequivocal
judicial precedent were found by the Court.141 In examining certain
potentially relevant precedents, however, Justice Harlan propounded
a new test for the applicability of Section 8(a)(3). His rejection of the
contention that Darlington's shutdown was no different legally, al-
though more severe in effect, than a lockout or a removal of operations
designed to frustrate unionization rested upon a novel point of dis-
tinction-whether or not the employer gained any "future benefit"
from the act of discrimination. Having created the hitherto unknown
requirement of benefit, the decision was forced to reinterpret prior
law to accommodate it. Under the reinterpretation, the "closing of an
entire business, even though discriminatory" and for anti-union mo-
tives, is entirely removed from the category of violations of Section
140. 380 U.S. at 270. It is somewhat startling to see the Court inquiring into details
of legislative intent in such circumstances. The Court has not infrequently observed that
in the case of the National Labor Relations Act, Congress laid down broad, basic rules
to be given specific application and definition by an administrative agency with special
expertise as to their implications:
The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and
unmistakable language each incident which would constitute an unfair labor practice.
On the contrary that Act left to the Board the work of applying the Act's general
prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which mght
be charged as violative of its terms. Thus a "rigid scheme of remedies" is avoided
and administrative flexibility within appropriate statutory limitations obtained to
accomplish the dominant purpose of the legislation.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945), citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
141. The Board, before the Fourth Circuit, had acknowledged that "there [was] no
decided case directly dispositive of Darlington's claim that it had an absolute right to
close its mill, irrespective of motive." 325 F.2d at 686.
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8(a)(3) because "the force of such a dosing is entirely spent as to that
business when termination of the enterprise takes place."'42
Had the decision gone no further, Darlington would merely repre-
sent a dubious exception-applicable only in the special circumstances
of an industrial suicide-to rules otherwise uniformly interpreted and
applied as to Section 8(a)(3).143 Having introduced the concept of
"benefit," however, Justice Harlan found it necessary to go much
further. Benefit should, after all, be examined in the context of an
employer's entire business enterprise. By analogy to runaway shop and
temporary dosing cases, Justice Harlan declared that if certain con-
ditions were fulfilled, even the closing of an entire plant might con-
stitute a Section 8(a)(3) violation.1 -4
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed
for antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another business,
whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of com-
mercial activity as the dosed plant, of sufficient substantiality to
give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement
of unionization in that business; (2) act to dose their plant with
the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relation-
ship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable
that its employees will fear that such business will also be closed
down if they persist in organizational activities, we think that an
unfair labor practice has been made out.1 45
142. 80 U.S. at 274. As a factual conclusion, the statement is subject to debate. As
the Board noted on remand, 165 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 65 L.ILR.M. 1391, 1404 (June 27, 1957),
"'our decision might possibly have been simplified by finding a 'future benelit' other than
the chilling of unionism, on the theory that, by liquidating Darlington and investing the
retrieved capital elsewhere in a functioning textile enterprise, the MiUlikens achieved a
substantial 'future benefit' at the expense of unionism while continuing to operate and
utilize the Darlington capital within the framework of an employer-employee relation-
ship.-"
143. Trial Examiner Buchanan, in his lengthy supplemental decision, supra note 133,
at 11, put the matter plainly if emotionally:
The Act forbids an employer to affect the employment relationship by discrimination
as described. It does not as an exception permit such discrimination where it is
committed to the limit of destroying completely the hire and tenure relationship.
Discriminatory discharge of one employee completely destroys the relationship as to
him and is recognized as violative. The basis is not clear (it is certainly not in the
Act) for a volte face declaration that the same statute permits multiplication of the
offense to the point of totality. Thus Section 2(3) of the Act unambiguously continues
in employee status those "whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connec-
tion with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice...." This
provision of the statute is amended, deleted, and indeed reversed by the Supreme
Court's declaration: "The dosing of an entire business, even though dtcriminatory,
ends the employer-employee relationship... "Furthermore, having recognized a closing
as "discriminatory," how can we deny that it is violative, whether there be a remedy
or not?
Nonetheless, as the Trial Examiner further observed, the Harlan opinion in Darlington
composed a dirge for the victims of industrial warfare; "Re quiescat a mals without resur-
rection or reincarnation." And, it might be added, without rationale.
144. Id. at 274-75.
145. Id. at 275-76.
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Justice Harlan was quick to add a highly significant qualification, how-
ever. Neither the motive requirement set forth in the second of these
conditions nor the effect made necessary by the third would be satisfied
by inference rather than direct evidence:
It does not suffice to establish the unfair labor practice charged
here to argue that the Darlington closing necessarily had an ad-
verse impact upon unionization in such other plants. We have
heretofore observed that employer action which has a foreseeable
consequence of discouraging concerted activities generally does
not amount to a violation of § 8(a)(3) in the absence of a showing
of motivation which is aimed at achieving the prohibited effect
[citing Local 357 and the concurrence of Justice Harlan therein].
In an area which trenches so closely upon otherwise legitimate
employer prerogatives, we consider the absence of Board findings
on this score a fatal defect in its decision.146
The case was, accordingly, remanded to the Board.
Justice Harlan's opinion in Darlington thus added new dimensions
to both the element of motive and the element of effect. Both were
made irrelevant absent evidence that a "future benefit" would be
gained. The Court's prior ruling that the individuals discriminated
against need not be those encouraged or discouraged was modified to
require a specific motive and effect as to the non-discriminatees 147 Fi-
nally, in cases involving the undefined area of "legitimate employer
prerogatives," Darlington ruled that motive cannot be inferred from
effect nor effect from motive; both require objective proof.
The inevitable problem of what constitutes such objective proof was
dramatized by the supplementary decisions made necessary by the
Court's remand in Darlington. The Trial Examiner, in his fifth hear-
ing on the case, held, inter alia,148 that there was insufficient evidence
in the record to demonstrate that the closing at Darlington had been
motivated by a desire to discourage unionization at other Deering Mil-
liken plants, or that it was either realistically foreseeable or indepen-
dently proven that employees at such other plants would fear loss of
employment if they persisted in organizational activities. The Board
reversed,149 finding adequate evidence of both the purpose and effect of
146. Id. at 276.
147. Radio Officers, of course, had stated specifically that "the Act does not require
that the employees discriminated against be the ones encouraged for purposes of violations
of § 8(a)(8)." 847 U.S, at 51.
148. Readers of the supplemental decision will, it is believed, regard use of the term
"inter alia" as unavoidable.
149. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 65 L.R.R.M. 1891 (June 27, 1967).
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"chilling." In doing so, however, it plainly anticipated an attack upon
its decision as lacking in specific as opposed to inferential proof:
Respondents argue that the Supreme Court is requiring ". .. con-
crete, specific, independent proof.. ." of a purpose to chill union-
ism. Insofar as this formulation is intended to be a restatement of
the Court's standard that there must be "... . a showing of motiva-
tion which is aimed at achieving the prohibited effect," we concur.
But the requisite motivation may be proved by something less than
direct evidence, rarely obtainable in cases of this kind. In this
branch of the law, as in all others, proof of motive may be supplied
by circumstantial evidence which affords a sound basis for drawing
inferences. 50
The same conclusion was reached as to the necessary evidential support
for a finding of the prohibited effect.1r5
150. Id. at 1400-01. In this respect, the Board pointedly cited and quoted the observa-
tion of the Ninth Circuit that:
Actual motive, a state of mind, being the question, it is seldom that direct evidence
will be available that is not also self-servin;. In such cases, the self-serving declara-
tion is not conclusive; the trier of fact may infer motive from te total circumstances
proved. Othenise, no person accused of unlawful motive who took the stand and
testified to a lawful motive could be brought to book.
Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966). The Board then
continued:
In pursuance of the delicate duty of discriminating between, or "sifting," separate
antiunion motives, we have attempted to ascertain, as precisely as possible, the motiva-
tion of Roger Milliken, as revealed by his conduct preceding the election at Darling-
ton, the manner and the circumstances of his behavior in making and implementing
the decision to close, the significant use to which he later put the closing, and the
inferences derivable therefrom. This, we believe, is far removed from simply equating
foreseeable consequences with prior motivation.
65 L.R.R.M. at 1402.
151. The Board concluded:(1) that the news of the Darlington dosing would be communicated to other Deering
Milliken employees, (2) that these other employees would be a-are of the connection
between Darlington and their mills, and (3) that the circumstances of the closing
would cause these employees to fear a similar consequence from any union activity
in which they might engage.
65 L.R.R.M. at 1403. The evidence sustaining these conclusions was primarily circumstan-
tial; for whatever reasons (possibly including an icy estimate on the part of Milliken em-
ployees of how best to continue being employed at a Milliken operation) the record lacked
a neat succession of employees who still held jobs testifying that they had heard of the
Darlington dosing and thereupon felt an immediate chill in the presence of union
organizers.
The alternative contentions urged on the Board as to the Court's requirements in the
way of "effect" are worth some attention. As the Board observed:
The parties offer differing constructions of what the Court means by "effect." General
Counsel argues that, once a chilling purpose is found, the answer to the question of
whether the employer "may reasonably have foreseen that [the dosing] would likely
have a 'chilling effect flows almost by necessity" from the affirmative answer to the
first question. [Citations omitted.] In other words, it would be only reasonable to
concur in an employer's judgment that his action, intended to be chilling, would
have the desired result. The Trial Examiner apparently would have rested on the
tendency of the closing adversely to affect employees elsewhere, but, having received
some evidence bearing on the actual effect on other employees, he felt that any
inference he might otherwise have drawn was dispelled by the unpersuasive charac-
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Two years after Darlington, while the Board was still struggling with
the implications of that decision, the Court once more turned to the
problem of motive, effect, and inference under Section 8(a)(3). In
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,15 2 an employer's refusal to pay
strikers the vacation benefits accorded nonstrikers was held by the
Board to be a violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1). The Fifth Circuit
refused enforcement of the Board order 1 3 on the ground that there had
been no affirmative showing of an unlawful motivation.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for a majority of the Court, while
less than clear on the point, accepted the premise that different treat-
ment of strikers and nonstrikers constituted "discrimination. ' ' 114 Ile
further concluded that "the act of paying accrued benefits to one group
of employees while announcing the extinction of the same benefits for
another group of employees who are distinguishable only by their par-
ticipation in protected concerted activity surely may have a discourag
ing effect on either present or future concerted activity."1 5 With dis-
crimination and an effect of discouragement of union membership thus
established, 5 6 the Chief Justice turned to the issue of motivation. The
difficulty which Great Dane Trailers presented in this regard was, once
again, an absence of any affirmative evidence as to what had impelled
the employer to engage in the action under challenge. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, in these circumstances, had relied upon its own expertise in con-
cluding that the action might have been motivated by such unimpeach-
able intentions as a desire to reduce costs, to encourage longer tenure
or to discourage absences immediately before vacation periods. Such
speculation was not, in the view of Chief Justice Warren, enough. His
opinion construed the Court's prior holdings in Erie Resistor, Ameri-
can Ship and Brown as establishing two categories of Section 8(a)(3)
violations. 157 The first category comprises situations in which the
ter of the evidence adduced. The Respondents contend that there must be a showing
of "actual effect" upon the employees.
65 L.R.R.M. at 1402 n.21.
152. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
153. 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966).
154. The claim of the strikers could be bottomed on either a "vested" right arising
out of the expired contract or a non-contractual "right" to any benefits established Is a
condition of employment. The majority opinion is not clear as to which of these bases Is
relied upon as sustaining the strikers' position although its use of the word "accrued"
might well import a contractual claim. It was this possible judicial (as opposed to arbitral)
construction of the agreement's terms which drew a major share of the attention of the
dissent.
155. 388 U.S. at 32.
156. The Court's use of the phrase "discouraging effect on concerted activity" rather
than direct reference to discouragement of union membership would seemingly cqtate
the two. Cf. Ward, supra note 32.
157. We noted in Erie Resistor ... that proof of an antiunion motivation may make
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discriminatory conduct is "inherently destructive of important em-
ployee rights." In such cases no proof of anti-union motive is necessary,
and a violation can be found even if the employer introduces affirma-
tive evidence of business justifications. Chief Justice Warren's second
category comprises situations in which "the adverse effect of the dis-
criminatory conduct on employee rights is 'comparatively slight.'" As
to this group of cases, an anti-union motive must be made out "if" (and
the word is emphasized in the Court's opinion) "the employer has come
forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions for the conduct."' 8s Since in the case at hand Great Dane had
failed to advance such "justifications" or "business considerations," the
Court did not consider it necessary to classify the company's action as
falling in either category; whatever the classification, the Board's action
was sustainable.
Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented.5 " They too found prior deci-
sions had established two categories of Section 8(a)(3) violations; their
delineation of these categories, however, constitutes a far different dis-
position of the interests involved. The dissenters' first category included
both violations based on actions serving no legitimate business purpose
and violations arising out of conduct "inherently severely destructive
of employee rights." As to this latter group Justices Harlan and Stewart
asserted that improper motive could be inferred from the actions them-
selves, and that even a legitimate business purpose could be held by
the Board not to justify the employer's conductl c° The dissenters' sec-
ond category included violations based on actions not "demonstrably
... destructive of employee rights" or "devoid of significant service to
unlawful certain employer conduct which would in other circumstances be lawful.
Some conduct, however, is so "inherently destructive of employee interests" that it
may be deemed proscribed without need for proof of an underlying improper motive
[citing Brown and American Ship]. That is, some conduct carries with it "unavoidable
consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended"
and thus bears "its own indicia of intent" [citing Erie Resistor]. If the conduct in
question falls within this "inherently destructive" category, the employer has the
burden of explaining away, justifying or characterizing "his actions as something dif-
ferent than they appear on their face," and if he fails, "an unfair labor practice
charge is made out." ... And even if the employer does come forvard with counter-
explanations for his conduct in this situation, the Board may neverthcless draw an
inference of improper motive from the conduct itself and exercise its duty to strike
the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of em-
ployee rights in light of the Act and its policy.... On the other hand, when "the
resulting harm to employee rights is... comparatively slight, and a substantial and
legitimate business end is served, the employer's conduct is prima facie lawful," and
an affirmative showing of improper motivation must be made. 388 U.S. at 33-34.
158. Id. at 34.
159. The dissenters' central concern was with the majority's treatment of "accrued"
rights. See note 154 supra.
160. The dissenters cited Erie Resistor in support of this proposition. 388 US. at 38.
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any legitimate business end." In these cases independent evidence of
the employer's anti-union animus would be required to find a viola-
tion.10' In the Harlan-Stewart view, the conduct of Great Dane Trailers
was clearly in the second of these categories. Accordingly, the absence
of proof of an unlawful motive plus the possibility of an inference of
legitimate motive destroyed the requisite basis for the violation charged.
The dissent in Great Dane Trailers accused the majority of having
adopted either a burden of proof test of minor but deviant character,
or of having restructured precedent to allow the Board to tamper with
the balance of economic power in labor-management struggles. What-
ever the majority's intent, the following term of court brought con-
firmation that Great Dane Trailers had in any case marked a deliberate
restatement of the motive test in operation. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co. 16 2 involved Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) charges resulting from an
employer's hiring of new employees rather than reinstating certain
strikers. The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order re-
quiring reinstatement, on the grounds that the record showed no evi-
dence of a motive on the part of the employer to discourage union
membership by the employment of new personnel.103 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded on the authority of Great Dane Trailers:
A refusal to reinstate striking employees, which is involved in this
case, is clearly no less destructive of important employee rights
than a refusal to make vacation payments. And because the em.
ployer here has not shown "legitimate and substantial businessjustifications," the conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice
without reference to intent. 64
III. Summary Analysis and Conclusions
A detailed history is necessary to any real understanding of why and
how "motive" has become an essential (albeit ambiguous) element in
employer discrimination cases. Yet the length and complexity of that
history may also serve to obscure what it should illustrate. The convo-
lutions of the three decades of litigation summarized in the foregoing
pages establish, it is submitted, three basic conclusions of considerable
161. Id.
162. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
163. 366 F.2d 126 (1966).
164. 389 U.S. at 380. Predictably, Justice Harlan (joined by Justice Stewiart) reglstcrcd
a separate statement of views finding the case determinable on the simple basis of a
mistake of law on the part of the employer, i.e., erroneously regarding strikers who have
made application for reinstatement as being in an equal or indistinguishable posture with
individuals previously having no conitact with the enterprise.
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import. First, the Supreme Court, contrary to the original legislative
design, has established motive as the ostensibly controlling element of
the violation. Second, the result has been to create an untenable divi-
sion of approach between Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) on the one hand,
and other, broader proscriptions of the statute on the other. Third,
establishment of motive as the benchmark of the violation has obscured
the actual basis of decision, and the process of decision has been warped
by the necessity to frame results in terms of motive. These conclusions
and their substantive support are the subject of the final section of this
study.
A. Motive and Effect in the Original Design of the Statute
It is well established that Congress enacted Section 8(a)(3) of the
Wagner Act in order "to insulate employees' jobs from their organiza-
tional rights."' .5 This aim could, no doubt, have been accomplished in
a variety of ways. Thus Congress could have worded the prohibition in
terms of motive, by prohibiting discrimination "with the intent" to
discourage union membership or non-membership.60 It could also have
defined unfair labor practices in terms of effect, by forbidding discrimi-
nation "which" encourages membership or non-membership107 Either
of these approaches might have better identified what was essential to
a finding of violation. In the final text of the legislation, however, Con-
gress defined the violation as "discrimination... to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization."' As Chester Ward's
early, perceptive analysis observed:
In each of subsections (1), (2), (4) and (5) the definition of the sub-
stantive unfair labor practice follows immediately the word "to";
that is, the conduct which is made the basis of liability for viola-
don of the Act is described after the word "to" in four out of the
five subsections. There is no reason to believe that that is not also
true in the fifth case, that of subsection (3). The unfair labor prac-
tice under subsection (3), then-the basis of liability-is for an
165. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
166. It is of some interest, in this regard, that Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(h) (1964), in dealing with conduct of a discriminatory nature,
specifically uses the benchmark of intent in defining the protection to be accorded a
"bona fide seniority or merit system" or incentive schedule. The statute notes that the
different treatment accorded various employees under such s)stems must not be "the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin" (emphasis added). Ability tests are likewise protected in the section if they are
"not designed, intended or used to discriminate" on the forbidden grounds.
167. It was this phraseology which was used in the 1934 bill which failed of passage.
See note 38 supra.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
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employer "to encourage or discourage membership in a labor orga-
nization." The words preceding "to" in subsection (8) must be
given effect, then, as a condition to liability, not as a basis of li-
ability. In other words, "discrimination" is the proscribed means
of encouragement or discouragement, but the prohibited conduct
is the encouragement or discouragement.1 9
The point deserves special emphasis. Strictly construed, the statutory
prohibition is directed against any encouragement or discouragement
of membership which is accomplished by discrimination; it plainly does
not proscribe only such discrimination as is intended to create that
effect.
The first references to motive by the Board and the Court were con-
sistent with such an interpretation. In its initial decision under the
Wagner Act, the Board quoted approvingly a Supreme Court reference
to motive as "a persuasive interpreter of equivocal conduct," 1 0 to be
distinguished from an essential element of the substantive violation.
At that time, and for some period thereafter, the ordinary Section
8(a)(3) case hinged upon a determination of whether punishment or
reward was the consequence of union activity or of some other cause.
The Board operated on the simple and not untenable presumption
that if an employee was discharged because he had solicited for a union
rather than because he had committed some other infraction of rules a
violation of the Act was established. Accordingly, the Board utilized
motive only to determine which of the two causes was the impelling
reason for the termination. "Motive," indeed, was equated with anti-
union animus rather than being treated in terms of an intention to
obtain a particular result.
The Board, in sum, initially read Section 8(a)(3) as prohibiting any
punishment or reward (discrimination) which was set in motion by the
union activities of an employee. Once it found such a connection the
Board did not, normally, conduct any separate inquiry as to whether
or not there had been an actual result of encouragement or discourage-
ment of membership. Nor, except in rare cases, did it inquire into or
make a separate finding as to the existence of an intent to create that
result. In the vast majority of discrimination cases coming before it at
that time, of course, either of these two inquiries might well have been
superfluous. When an employee is discharged because he has joined a
union, a result of discouragement of membership and an intent to
169. Ward, supra note 32, at 1156.
170. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., I N.L.R.B. 1, 23 (1935).
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achieve that result may be ineluctable. Radio Officers made the mistake
of assuming that these cases therefore demonstrated that the element of
intent, because it was frequently present, was always critical. But, and
the caveat is an essential one, the fact that an act which punishes a per-
son for union activity normally subsumes a desire to discourage union
membership does not of itself establish that such a desire is a necessary
ingredient of the prohibited conduct. Radio Officers to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Board's use of motive was in the area of findings
of fact rather than conclusions of law. Where, as in many instances,
issue was joined as to whether punishment or reward was the result of
union activity, "motive" was utilized to resolve that fact question and
that fact question only rather than to establish, separately, an intent
to increase or decrease adherence to the labor organization.
Not only did the early litigation under the Act fail affirmatively to
establish intent to discourage or encourage membership as an essential
element of a Section 8(a)(3) violation, but both the Board and the
Supreme Court gave explicit recognition to the opposite conclusion.
Discrimination which discouraged union membership was held to con-
stitute a violation of the statute even in circumstances negating any
showing of an intent to achieve that aim. Republic Aviation, together
with the other cases referred to above, make this evident beyond con-
test. In those cases any motive to discourage or encourage was either
absent, as a matter of record evidence, or was contradicted by the record
evidence. The result-the impact of discouragement-was nonetheless
accepted as fulfilling the requirements for the violation.
B. The Motive Requirement as Developed by the Court
It is apparent in retrospect, then, that when, in Radio Officers, Jus-
tice Reed posited a "purpose" to encourage or discourage union mem-
bership as a "controlling" factor in employer discrimination cases, his
assertion was not justified by a careful reading of either the statute or
existing precedent. It is not surprising that in order to avoid reversing
such cases as Republic Aviation in which a motive to discourage was
not proven (or was directly controverted), he was forced to create an
exception to the requirement which he had just established. The ac-
commodation device he used was to supply the missing or rebutted mo-
tive by inference. The procedure was deceptively simple in statement.
Unlike motive itself, Justice Reed observed, "specific evidence" of such
intent is not "an indispensable element" of the violation. There are
"certain types of discrimination" which must "inherently" discourage
or encourage. When that result is foreseeable, "it is presumed" that the
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employer or union intended such a consequence. Intent, in short, can
be supplied by certain types and forms of discrimination rather than
by independent evidence.
The majority opinion in Radio Officers, accordingly, did not reverse
the line of cases exemplified by Republic Aviation; it preserved their
results by revising the premises on which they had been decided. Yet it
was that procrustean attempt to restructure past results in terms of new
theories of decision which became the source of future difficulties.
Under Radio Officers, acts of discrimination which would result in en-
couragement or discouragement of union membership remained the
general subject of prohibition. Henceforth, however, each such action
was required to be analyzed from the standpoint of motive. In a situ-
ation where direct proof of motive was absent or controverted, the
Board could no longer be content with a conclusion that the effect of
the discrimination would be a perceptible increase or diminution of
employee desire to join and remain a member of a union. It was re-
quired to find that such an effect was not only present but was so evi-
dent and so powerful as to support an inference of intent to achieve it.
If the shift in emphasis brought about by Radio Officers was a subtle
one, it nonetheless has had important and far-reaching consequences.
One of its most significant effects has been to force the Board to make
largely artificial judgments in many labor dispute situations. It is a
rare employer or union which is now unsophisticated enough to leave
any kind of direct evidence of its "motive" in taking an action which
conceivably can be challenged under Sections 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2). Thus,
while such evidence might have been adduced in Local 357,17, the
Board could only speculate about the motives underlying the lockout
in American Ship, the replacement policies in Erie Resistor and Brown,
and the alteration in vacation benefits in Great Dane. In addition, the
increasing complexity of industrial relations and the growth of sophis-
tication on both sides of the bargaining table have inexorably brought
a constantly widening range of actions within the possible application
of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). These actions may well frequently be
the result of intentions which are beyond the reach of record evidence.
Indeed, they may be the result of pressures or goals which, in their
inception, have nothing whatever to do with union membership or
non-membership, although they ultimately have substantial impact
thereon. The Board, nonetheless, has been required to apply standards
171. See p. 1294 supra, note 178 infra.
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of "motive" to records barren (whether deliberately or unavoidably) of
any direct evidence of intent.
The problems and complications thus engendered became initially
apparent in Local 357. There the Board attempted to treat the general
subject of hiring halls and union controls of employment opportunities
on the basis of its expert knowledge and long experience as to their
impact upon the exercise of employee rights. "Motive," whether or not
provable by direct evidence, was established by inference on the basis
of administrative expertise. The Court, in rejecting this approach,
made it evident that the Board's power to infer any element of the
violation was sharply circumscribed. Justice Harlan's concurrence un-
derlined the degree to which this restraint could curtail the Board's
authority in the specific area of motive. In his opinion, the power to
establish an illegal motive to encourage or discourage membership by
inference rather than direct evidence is a closely limited power, opera-
tive only where the record shows no "significant" and "legitimate" jus-
tification for the action claimed to be illegally motivated. Justice Har-
lan's treatment of "business justifications" as negating an inference of
illegal motive demonstrated the extent of Radio Officer' influence.
"Business justification," of course, is but another label for a specific
type of motive which, if proffered by an employer or a union and found
to be both significant and legitimate, can outweigh the implied mo-
tive of encouragement or discouragement based upon the known effect
of the discrimination.
Under Justice Harlan's gloss, accordingly, the category of discrimi-
nation cases in which motive could not be proven by direct evidence
was made subject to very special standards of judgment. Although a
prohibited result-in the sense of apparent encouragement or discour-
agement of union membership-might be evident, the proscription of
such injury became dependent upon a weighing of the alleged justifi-
cation against the implied unlawful intent. It must be observed, of
course, that there was and is other precedent for a determination that
a legitimate counter-interest will save an action from what would other-
wise be a literal violation of the statute. Such limits, however, have
been most clearly necessary and most easily justified where tie statu-
tory language is so broad as to necessitate some narrowing by judicial
interlineation. This has been particularly true in the case of Sections
8(a)(1) and (5).Y2 Justice Harlan's "weighing process," however, went
172. Thus permanent replacement of employees on strike for higher wages may, con-
strued broadly, amount to an interference with or restraint of their right to strike as con-
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far beyond this precedent in imposing a similar gloss upon a violation
as to which Congress had been specific rather than general.
The weighing process described by Justice Harlan in Local 357 was
subsequently adopted by the Court, although without agreement as to
its precise form. The division in viewpoint became plain in Erie Re-
sistor, American Ship and Brown. In each of these cases there was ac-
tion by an employer which arguably reduced the desires of employees
to become or remain members of a union. No affirmative evidence of
a motive to discourage union membership, however, was present in the
record; on the contrary, the employer argued in each case that the ac-
tion had been taken in his own legitimate economic interest. Thus,
under Radio Officers' requirement that unlawful motive must be in-
ferred from the challenged action and Justice Harlan's Local 357 bal-
ancing test, the Court was impelled to find the action lawful or unlaw-
ful in terms of unrevealed and unprovable "intent" balanced against
a claimed business justification. That the members of the Court dem-
onstrated deep disagreement as to the proper standards for doing so is
hardly surprising.
The variety of separate opinions in these cases reveal two basic ver-
sions of the "balancing test." In Erie Resistor, Justice White suggested
that the process was a simple balancing of harm to employee rights
against legitimate gain for the employer. Indeed, his opinion strongly
suggested that terming this an inquiry into motive misstated the actual
decision being made, a choice between rival interests. In American
Ship, however, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that,
when there is an absence of direct evidence of unlawful motivation,
the inference of an intent to discourage membership must be "so com-
pelling" as to make an- innocent purpose improbable. To Justice Stew-
art, accordingly, the process was not a simple measurement of possible
harm to employees against the claimed legitimate interest of the em-
ployer; rather the former must be so strong as virtually to obviate the
possibility that the latter could be valid. Justice White, the Chief Jus-
tice, and Justice Goldberg all registered disagreement with this propo-
sition. They found the proper test, as in Erie Resistor, to be a weighing
demned by Section 8(a)(1). Yet the employer's interest in maintaining his business in a
purely economic battle with his employees has been held to obviate the presence of a
Section 8(a)(1) violation in such a case. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 804
U.S. 33, 345-46 (1938). Likewise, the refusal of an employer to accede to union contract
demands could be, in a broad sense, considered a refusal to bargain in good faith; judicial
limits on such an approach, however, were not only instituted by the courts themselves
but received explicit congressional approval in the amendment of Section 8(d) of the Act
in 1947.
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of the comparative interests rather than the requirement of an almost
irrebuttable presumption. Nonetheless, in Brown, Justice Brennan's
majority opinion not only approvingly repeated the severe limits on
inference of motive contained in American Ship but suggested in addi-
tion that a motive to discourage or encourage cannot be supplied absent
record evidence unless it is the only "reasonable inference."
In none of the three cases just discussed would the result reached by
the Court probably have been affected by a different choice between
these two quite disparate approaches to the requirements of Section
8(a)(3). That fact, however, should not obscure the depth of the divi-
sion on the Court and the possibly decisive effect of the choice of ap-
proach in other situations. Great Dane Trailers clearly illustrates the
problem. It would have been difficult in that case to contend that the
employer action under attack was of a nature so devastating to Sec-
tion 7 rights as to render a motive to discourage union membership
the only reasonable inference. Under the majority's test in American
Ship and Brown, accordingly, no violation would be established in the
absence of direct evidence of unlawful intent. On the other hand, a
simple weighing of management and union interests as advocated by
Justice Goldberg might well have allowed a contrary result. The ma-
jority opinion in Great Dane Trailers side-stepped this confrontation.
It avoided the implications of American Ship by holding its test inap-
plicable to a situation where no showing of legitimate purposes (busi-
ness justifications) has been made by the respondent.
The two-category approach to Section 8(a)(3) violations adopted by
a majority of the Court in Great Dane Trailers and reaffirmed in
Fleetwood Trailer can be interpreted as an implied partial rejection of
the motive requirement in, at least, its Radio Officers form. Where the
effect of an action upon Section 7 rights is major, motive becomes ir-
relevant. The Board need not establish a purpose to encourage or dis-
courage membership; conversely, legitimate motive-a business justi-
fication-will not avail even if affirmatively proven. Where the effect
upon Section 7 rights is minor, motive will be inferred (despite the
absence of any devastating effect) unless major and legitimate interests
of the respondent are shown by the record to have been served by the
action. Plainly, the latter situation merely parallels the result which
would be reached by a simple weighing of relative damage and benefit.
If the Court intended such a rejection, however, it failed to accomplish
the full measure of its goal. Great Dane Trailers and Fleetwood Trailer
rest heavily, if not primarily, upon the failure of respondents counsel
to offer an affirmative justification for the act in question. Future
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pleaders will, it is assumed, have this in mind together with the obvious
conclusion that plausible justification can frequently be advanced
whether or not it actually played any part in the formulation of the
decision under contest.
C. The Impact of the Motive Requirement
1. The Creation of a Dichotomous Approach
As has been suggested previously, one effect of the "motive" require.
ment has been to disguise and distort the original congressional design
as to discrimination cases under the statute. That effect will be dealt
with in some detail in the concluding portions of this summary. Before
proceeding to such an analysis, however, it is worth noting the impact
of the motive test in another area, that of Section 8(a)(1). It is sub-
mitted that the elevation of motive to the status of an indispensable
element in Section 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) violations has forced the Court
to create an artificial and untenable dichotomy in the statute. Further,
as a result of this dichotomy, the disposition of discrimination cases
may well vary depending upon which unfair labor practice section,
Section 8(a)(1) or Section 8(a)(3), is given precedence. This conclusion
is amply supported by a comparison of the Court's decisions in Burnup
& Sims and Darlington.
The motive of the employer in Burnup & Sims was, so far as the
record shows, unimpeachable; he wished to rid himself of individuals
whom he mistakenly but honestly believed had threatened the use of
dynamite to blow up his property. Disposition of the case under Section
8(a)(3) in the context of motive, accordingly, would have been difficult;
difficult, at least, from the standpoint of protecting employees whose
organizational activity had led, however inadvertently, to their dis-
charge. Record proof of an unlawful motive was clearly absent. To
infer it, in the face of the employer's protestations and the circum-
stances of the case, might well strain even judicial imagination. Under
the restrictive tests subsequently set forth by the majority in American
Ship, in fact, such an inference may well have been beyond the Board's
reach. Justice Douglas, accordingly, avoided motive and its complica-
tions by treating the controversy as one involving only the restrictions
of Section 8(a)(1). Under the broad proscriptions of that provision he
could reasonably conclude that when employees are in fact punished
for the exercise of Section 7 rights rather than some assumed miscon-
duct, it does not matter whether the assumption of misconduct was a
matter of good or bad faith on the part of the employer.
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In Darlington the challenged punishment was again severance from
active employment. In contrast to the approach of Burnup & Sims,
however, Section 8(a)(3) and its restrictions were held applicable. Jus-
tice Harlan, in Darlington, without citing Burnup & Sims, made it
plain that while some employer actions may be litigable under Section
8(a)(1) without attention to motive, those which trench closely upon
employer interests may only be resolved under Section 8(a)(3). We must
conclude then that, as to a certain class of actions -which the Court
considers (or may in the future consider) to be of particular impor-
tance, Section 8(a)(3) and the test of motivation will be controlling;
as to others the non-motive approach of Blurnup 6 Sims will remain
applicable. No precise delineation of the two separate categories is of-
fered by the Court except an ambiguous reference to "management
prerogatives," a designation which can be fairly applied to practically
all of the actions taken by the employers in the plethora of cases pre-
viously discussed.
The importance of Darlington and Burnup & Sims, however, is not
merely that the Court has failed to describe standards for determining
when an action "trenches" so closely upon essential interests as to
require a different standard of restriction. These cases are also notable
because they accept a basic division of approach betwveen Sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), a division which dashes directly with the congres-
sional design. At the time the original legislation was under consider-
ation, Senator Wagner explained the relationship between the broad
restrictions of Section 8(a)(l)-then Section 8(l)-and the four de-
tailed prohibitions which follow it:
Experience over a considerable period of time . . . has made it
clear that . . . general declarations of freedom have little effect
unless they are accomplished by a specific catalog of forbidden
practices. Therefore, the succeeding four unfair-labor-practice
provisions, without narrowing in any way the widest possible ap-
plication of the first, enunciate with particularity the concrete
acts which have been the most fertile source of trouble in the
past. 73
The Senate Report on the proposed legislation emphasized the same
point:
The four succeeding unfair-labor-practices are designed not to
impose limitations or restrictions upon the general guarantees of
173. 2 NLRB, I.AaJS~nVx HIsroRY OF THE NATIONAL ALOR RELAToMs Acr-1935
2332-33 (1949) (emphasis added).
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the first, but rather to spell out with particularity some of the
practices that have been most prevalent and most troublesome.,14
Since 1935, indeed, it has been universally recognized that any vio-
lation of Sections 8(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5) must also, automatically,
constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Some acts, it is true, may in-
fringe only the latter section. In Darlington, however, a new theory
was adopted-that some actions cannot be a violation of Section 8(a)(l)
unless they also violate Section 8(a)(3). The holding ignores the clear
instruction of Congress that the latter section was not to "narrow in
any way," or "to impose limitations or restrictions" upon the broader
prohibition. One can rationalize Justice Harlan's position in Darling-
ton with the statutory design only, in fact, if the restrictions which lie
finds in Section 8(a)(3) are considered to be equally applicable under
Section 8(a)(1). Yet the latter reading is in clear conflict with both the
holding in Burnup & Sims and Justice Harlan's own statements in
Darlington. In the latter case, while not citing Burnup & Sims, Justice
Harlan recognized its impact by acknowledging that a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) "presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a
discriminatory motive.' 7i He then created a class of actions (those
trenching closely upon management prerogative) which were to be
immune from the reach of Section 8(a)(1) unless unlawful under the
motive standard of Section 8(a)(3). It is impossible to avoid the con-
clusion that Darlington-despite the congressional instructions--
makes Section 8(a)(1) distinct from and subservient to the latter section.
While it is a precarious business, indeed, to predict the course of
future opinions of the Court, there is considerable reason to believe
that, ultimately, the dichotomy created by Burnup & Sims and Dar-
lington must and will be rejected. Both the majority and the concur-
ring opinions in American Ship and Brown separately analyzed the
employer actions under attack, first under Section 8(a)(1) and then
under Section 8(a)(3). In neither the majority nor the concurring opin-
ions, however, was it suggested that substantially different sets of cri.
teria were applicable under the two subsections. It seems probable
that this retreat from formal differentiation will continue. Quite apart
174. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), in 2 LEc. Hisr N.L.R.A. 2309.
175. 380 U.S. at 268. Justice Harlan, however, in his separate opinion in Burnup &
Sims, appeared to believe that it was a "rare" case in which motive could be ignored
even under Section 8(a)(1). 379 U.S. 21, 25 (1964). But see his concurring opinion in NLIUB
v. Fleetwood Trailers, 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967), in which, although violations of both
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 8(a)(3) were charged, Justice Harlan concluded that "[t]he prob-
lems of 'employer motivation' and 'legitimate business justification' are not . involved."
389 U.S. at 383.
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from legislative history, the administrative and judicial difficulties
which are inherent in the differentiation adopted in Darlington make
common criteria essential.
2. The Fictive vs. The Real Basis for Decision
While the statutory dichotomy created in Darlington is significant,
the most important effects of the motive requirement have appeared
in other areas. The substance of the decisions which have occupied
the major portions of this study is illustrative of the great variety of
highly important employer and union activity which now takes place
under circumstances which makes proof of actual motive either arti-
ficial or impossible. Establishment and enforcement of plant rules
(Republic Aviation), employer countermeasures against strikes (Brown
and Erie Resistor), allocation of benefits (Gaynor News and Great
Dane Trailers), control over hiring (Local 357) and lockouts (Buffalo
Linen and American Ship) all involve conduct as to which the "true"
motive of the employer or the union is highly unlikely to have been
registered in a form capable of direct proof. In such instances "motive"
must normally be a matter of speculation.
It is difficult to disagree with Justice White's observation in Erie
Resistor that, in determining the legality of such conduct, what the
Board and the Court are really doing is resolving the tension between
the employer's ability to continue his business successfully and the
employee's exercise of rights guaranteed under Section 7. Indeed, in
Buffalo Linen the nature of the decision to be made-a choice between
conflicting interests-was openly acknowledged by the Court, as was
the Board's superior ability initially to make that choice. When, how-
ever, as in the cases just discussed, this choice between conflicting in-
terests was converted into an analysis of competing and frequently
unprovable motives, the essence of what was to be decided became
obscured and the process of adjudication was basically altered. The
resulting concealment of the real issues involved may help account for
the obvious attraction of the motive concept to a majority of the Court.
It is a difficult and delicate matter to state to the Board that the Su-
preme Court disagrees as to the assessment the agency has made of
the value of a lockout or a hiring hall to employers or unions, respec-
tively. It is far easier to assert that the Board has erred as to the legal
concept of motive than that the Court takes a different view of the
respective importance of the economic interests at stake.
The point is aptly illustrated by American Ship. There the Board
concluded that a lockout barring employees from their normal eco-
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nomic livelihood so long as they continued to demand greater benefits
might well decrease their desire to adhere to the union. The conclu-
sion is at least plausible. Substantially all of the Court, however, found
that this impact of discouragement was more a possibility than a fact,
at least in the circumstances of that case. Conversely, the employer's
fears of damage to its customer relations in the case of a sudden strike
as well as its understandable desire to limit the cost of a new contract
were regarded by the Court as of substantial weight. Several approaches
were thus open to the Court. The Board finding of a violation could
have been overturned on the ground that an effect of actual discour-
agement was rebutted by the weight of the evidence. Or, in the fashion
of Buffalo Linen, the question could have been viewed as a choice
between competing interests and the Board reversed because it had
not established a valid basis for its determination. Or, as a majority of
the Court elected, the question could be treated as one involving a
weighing of the proffered pure and the implied impure motivation
of the employer.
It seems plain that use of motivation as the essential point of refer-
ence in such situations merely obscures the actual determination being
made-a choice between rival interests. Let us assume, for the pur-
poses of illustration, that an industrious investigator preparing for trial
in a case identical to American Ship uncovers a memorandum from
the employer's files in which one executive describes to another the
economic forces justifying a lockout but adds the phrase "and going
without a paycheck for a while will teach the lousy sons of bitches a
lesson." Under the motive test apparently all members of the Court
would agree that evidence of such an intent would invalidate the
lockout;lvd Presumably, then, the foregoing memorandum would have
converted a lockout which all members of the Court found to be in
the valid, economic interests of the employer and with little or no
impact upon union membership into an action condemned by the
statute. Perhaps; but the net result would strike many as coming peri-
lously close to conviction for a state of mind rather than an attempt to
remedy any real evil. It may well be asked whether the thrust of the
National Labor Relations Act is to prohibit bad thoughts, or to curb
harmful conduct. And if the latter, are bad thoughts to be held to
176. The majority opinion in Brown noted, in this regard, that "antiunion motivation
will convert an otherwise ordinary business act into an unfair labor practice." 380 1.S.
at 288. And in American Ship the majority concluded that the lockout was lawful If It
was for the "sole" purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear upon the union. 880 U.S.
at 18.
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make harmless conduct illegal? If the Congress in 1935 intended to
punish all employers then harboring unkind views as to unions it
invested the Board with a truly Herculean task. It is more probable
that Congress attempted to curb employer action rather than employer
thought, and that the concern was with injury to employee rights, how-
ever pure or impure the motivation for that injury.
The masking accomplished by the motivation approach is most evi-
dent, oddly enough, in Darlington. The convoluted, tortuous decision
by Justice Harlan in that case was based upon a simple choice between
two incompatible interests. In making that choice, however, it pro-
vided a vivid example of the difficulties which the motive test inevi-
tably raises. In Darlington, discrimination, motive, and effect were all
amply established. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that no violation
of Section 8(a)(3) had yet been proven. No violation was considered
established because the employer action-going out of business-was
not one which the Court was willing to allow the Board to regulate.
The decision in Darlington represented, in effect, a conclusion by the
Court that an employer's right to cease operation of his entire enter-
prise takes precedence over the statutory rights of the employees who
thereby lose employment. Whether Justice Harlan was right or wrong
in his estimate of the congressional wishes in this regard, the essential
fact is that it was a weighing of competing interests, not an inquiry
into motive, which was at issue.
Darlington, in its refusal to find a violation despite the plain pres-
ence of discrimination provably intended to discourage membership,
is but the clearest example of a conclusion which is also implicit in
the remaining decisions discussed above. Those cases demonstrate that
motive is, indeed, the "fictive formality" which Justice Frankfurter,
in Radio Officers, suspected it to be. It is true that Justice Frankfur-
ter's reference was restricted to those instances in which "a conclusion
by the Board that the employer's acts are likely to help or hurt a union
will be so compelling that a further and separate finding characterizing
the employer's state of mind 177 would be unnecessary. The phrase
would thus encompass only cases falling within the first of the two
categories of Section 8(a)(3) violations posited by Chief Justice Warren
in Great Dane Trailers, those in which the discriminatory conduct is
"inherently destructive of important employee rights." It requires only
brief reflection, however, to see that motive is equally a fiction, so far
as the true basis of decision is concerned, in the second of the Chief
177. 347 US. at 55.
1327
The Yale Law Journal
Justice's categories. That group comprises those instances in which the
discrimination has only a "comparatively slight" effect on employee
rights and may be justified by legitimate and substantial business
justifications.
Three possible situations can arise in such cases. If no legitimate
and substantial interests are shown on the record to be served by the
action under attack, motive is implied-an obvious formality and a
patent fiction. If legitimate and substantial interests are set forth in
the record, the determination made will plainly be a balancing of
respective interests-statutory versus economic. In such instances, the
injury to statutory interests being admittedly slight, the balance pre-
sumably will always be struck on the side of the economic interests.
Unless, that is, as in the third possible situation, evidence of legitimate
and substantial economic interests is then met by actual evidence of
an intent to impede statutory rights. It is only as to this last alternative,
accordingly, that motive would play any realistic part in the decisional
process. The Court does not, however, make reference to any instance
in which a "slight" injury to statutory rights accompanied by a proven
intent to discourage union membership was also supported, on the
record, by legitimate and substantial business justifications. It is appro-
priate to inquire, accordingly, whether all complaints alleging discrimi-
nation should be governed by a requirement of motive which can have
meaning only as to an insignificant fraction of the total. Even as to
that fraction, moreover, it is questionable whether a federal agency
should prohibit action admittedly supported by legitimate employer
or union interests on the basis of a finding as to state of mind where
the injury inflicted is designated as "slight."
3. Motive in Its Impact on the Weighing Process
It is of ironic significance that in only two of the post-Radio Officers
cases discussed above was a motive to encourage or discourage union
membership actually or probably provable. In Darlington, of course,
the employer's intention to extinguish unionization along with the
enterprise itself was well established. In Local 357, while not a part of
the record, evidence might well have been available as to the intention
of the union to encourage membership by establishing the hiring
hall.178 The irony is supplied by the outcome in both cases-a finding
of no violation. 7 9 It would be erroneous, however, to conclude on this
178. See p. 1294 supra.
179. This is, of course, apart from the possibility left open in Darlington of a violation
as to employees other than those terminated at the liquidated plant.
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basis that the motive element, although fictive and a formality, has
not affected the process of decision in discrimination cases.
Under the Radio Officers rule, where direct evidence of motive is
absent from the record, a finding of violation requires that an unlaw-
ful intention be established by inference. If inference then becomes
essential, the basis on which the inference can be sustained becomes
even more vital. In Radio Officers the Court relied upon the ancient
doctrine that one may be held to "intend" the foreseeable conse-
quences of his actions. Under that approach, it is perfectly under-
standable that a majority of the Court has, from time to time, con-
sidered that the results of an action must be dramatic and devastating
in their impact on Section 7 rights in order to supply an inferred in-
tention to interfere with their exercise. In the words of Justice Stewart
in American Ship, the impact on those rights must be "so compelling
that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's protestations of inno-
cent purpose."' 80 It must be "demonstrably so destructive of collective
bargaining"' 18 or "so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of
significant economic justification"'1 - as to allow only an implication
(and no other) of illegal intent. This, of course, is in vivid contrast
to the conclusion of Buffalo Linen that the ultimate problem in dis-
crimination cases is "the balancing of the conflicting legitimate inter-
ests,"'1 8 3 and to Justice White's observation in Erie Resistor that "pre-
ferring one motive to another is in reality the far more delicate task
... of weighing the interest of employees in concerted activity against
the interest of the employer in operating his business in a particular
manner.... ",8
The decisions in American Ship and Brown seem to indicate that,
if a weighing process is indeed at the heart of "non-motive" dis-
crimination cases, a majority of the Court considers it a balancing
which requires a thumb upon the scales. Because an "implied" moti-
vation must be supplied indicating that the respondent must have
wished to affect union membership, something more than a simple
weighing is necessary. It requires more than a slight edge in relative
gains and losses to establish convincingly that an act resulted from
malice aforethought. In the White-Warren-Goldberg view, by contrast,
the motive requirement is reduced to a far less restrictive device. The
180. 380 U.S. at 311-12.
181. 380 U.S. at 309.
182. 380 U.S. at 311.
183. 553 U.S. at 96.
184. 373 US. at 228-29.
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essence of the determination to be made is whether any legitimate
interest of the employer or union is sufficient to outweigh whatever
damage is done to employee rights by the discrimination, Unlawful
"motive" is implicitly assumed to exist, for purposes of a technical
reading of the Act, whenever the balance rests upon the side of em-
ployee rights. While intent is thus still a technical consideration, it is
patent that this test grants the Board far greater authority to condemn
or approve challenged conduct. Indeed this flexibility may well have
been a factor in the rejection of that test by a majority of the Court
in American Ship and Brown. Justice Brennan, at least, is deeply con-
cerned with the possible use of Board powers to influence the amount
of economic pressure which may be brought to bear on either side of
the labor-management confrontation."*6
The importance of this disagreement within the Court as to the
manner in which the motive requirement is to be applied in cases
where direct proof of illegal intent is absent deserves some final eim.
phasis. From Local 357 to Brown that disagreement, while becoming
more and more apparent, was a division in approach rather than one
requiring a different conclusion in any of the cases under study. Apart
from the dissent by Justices Clark and Whittaker in Local 357 and
Justice White's dissent in Brown, the two major factions on the Court
did not disagree as to the eventual outcome in this series of decisions.
Great Dane Trailers, however, demonstrated that cases must arise in
which proof of the respondent's illegal motive is absent, and in which
the presence or absence of unfair labor practices will depend upon the
question of how that motive is to be implied. Justice Harlan's dissent
in Great Dane Trailers demonstrates that application of what has been
characterized as the "thumb on the scales" approach, requiring over.
whelming impact as the supplier of implied motive, would have meant
dismissal of the complaint in that case.
It is not at all clear that Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
majority in Great Dane Trailers marked a rejection of the "thumb
upon the scales" approach in favor of a straight balancing of interests.
The Warren approach was restricted in scope; in the case of "slight"
restraints upon Section 7 rights, the imputation of an illegal motive
is a formality unless affirmative evidence of business justifications is
established on the record. It is instinct more than confident legal analy-
185. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, Justice Brennan had warned the Board
that it was not to act as an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use
in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands." B61 U.S. at 497.
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sis which suggests that the Court, in Great Dane Trailers, paused for
consideration of the implications of adoption of either of the two
contending approaches in the "non-motive" situations which are cer-
tain to occur with increasing frequency and with increasingly impor-
tant effects.
If the foregoing is correct and, in Great Dane Trailers, the Court
has held open the door of final decision rather than slamming it on
the fingers of either faction, some final words of respectful advice may
not be out of place. As has been shown, the rule in Radio Officers is
not supported either by a careful reading of the statute or by the
Board and judicial precedents relied upon in the Radio Officers opin-
ion. Its legacy, whether or not intended at the time, has been a con-
version of the question of what limits are to be placed upon the power
of employers and unions into one which must be determined within
the form of an inquiry into motive. The increased latitude which this
mode of inquiry has allowed the courts has been matched by a corre-
sponding decrease in the authority of the Board to operate with a con-
fidence based upon its real or presumed expertise. All of which sug-
gests, but also veils, the nature of the struggle involved. That conflict
concerns the limits to be placed upon the power of the Board to act
when it finds, in its judgment, that the goals of the National Labor
Relations Act are endangered by an action whose motivation is either
clouded or unprovable. The White-Warren-Goldberg approach re-
quires, in such circumstances, that the Board assess the degree to which
encouragement or discouragement of membership will result, the de-
gree to which employer or union interests are involved, and to reach
a judgment as to which of the two factors has greater weight. That
this is neither an easy task nor one readily yielding predictable results
is obvious. It is, however, a process of judgment which openly grapples
with that which is truly in dispute-the relative advantage or disad-
vantage which is to be accorded one of the contestants in an economic
battle. It is a process of judgment, moreover, which at least attempts
the creation of objective standards rather than placing reliance upon
the fictions of judicial imagination.
It is not possible, of course, for the outside observer to determine
whether and to what extent the recent decisions of the Court in Great
Dane Trailers and Fleetwood Trailer represent a rejection of prior
approaches. Both decisions ostensibly rest upon existing doctrine de-
spite the fact that both dearly represent an avoidance of motive as a
decisive element in discrimination cases. Both decisions, furthermore,
ignore the inevitable confrontation which will surely be created by
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attorneys now alert to the necessity of affirmatively proving a "justi-
fication" for any contested business action whether taken by manage-
ment or by a union. That confrontation-where an action less than
devastating to Section 7 rights is nonetheless injurious to them although
apparently justified by separate economic considerations-will finally
test whether the Court still chooses to view the fictive formality as the
decisive element in discrimination cases, or whether it prefers to weigh
advantage against disadvantage free from the haze of unprovable in-
tent. Whatever the merits of the two approaches, it is indisputable
that the final choice between them will immunize or condemn a wide
range of action and broaden or circumscribe the authority of the
Board to supervise the conduct of labor-management relations. In
making that choice, the Court would do well to consider the words
of one of its members:
It is sometimes thought to be astute political management of a
shift in position to proclaim that no change is under way. That is
designed as a sedative to instill confidence and allay doubts . ..
Precedents, though distinguished and qualified out of existence,
apparently have been kept alive. The theory is that the outward
appearance of stability is what is important....
But the more blunt, open, and direct course is truer to demo-
cratic traditions. . . . A judiciary that discloses what it is doing
and why it does it will breed understanding. And confidence based
on understanding is more enduring than confidence based on
awe.18 6
186. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 735, 754 (1949).
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